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Surveillant and Counselor: A Reorientation in
Compliance for Broker-Dealers
James A. Fanto∗
This Article argues that the compliance officer should play a major
role in the ongoing reform of broker-dealers and other financial firms.
This role is facilitated by the fact that compliance is now well established
and accepted and compliance officers are close to decision making at all
levels of a firm. The contention is that the role of compliance must be
rethought and reoriented if it is to contribute fully to the reform.
Compliance officers now ensure that the firms and their employees
comply with the numerous laws and regulations governing them and
their activities, primarily by producing and then revising detailed
compliance procedures and policies, and monitoring compliance with
them. The policies and procedures direct the conduct of employees by
surrounding them with a web of detailed instructions, procedures,
supervisory review, reporting, oversight, and investigation, where
necessary. This approach, which is based on a well-established “external”
model of direction, discipline, and surveillance, is necessary to prevent
self-interested and opportunistic conduct by financial firm employees.
However, there is a risk that employees follow only the letter of
compliance and at times ignore it altogether because they understand
that the rules are different from, and secondary to, the actual securities
business. Moreover, the external approach “crowds out” another model
that is necessary to achieve the most effective compliance: Ideal brokerdealer compliance would promote “internal,” in addition to external,
compliance. The goal of the internal approach is to have firm employees
internalize the policies of the laws and regulations and the professional
and ethical standards so that they come into the foreground when the
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Business Law & Regulation, Brooklyn Law School. I would like to thank William Araiza,
Miriam Baer, Anita Bernstein, Steven Dean, Cynthia Godsoe, Edward Janger, Roberta Karmel,
Arthur Laby, Gregg Macey, Minor Myers, David Reiss, Larry Solan, and Nelson Tebbe for
their comments on this Article. I am also grateful for comments offered to me by participants
during a conference on “The Growth and Importance of Compliance in Financial Firms:
Meaning and Implications,” sponsored by Brooklyn Law School’s Center for the Study of
Business Law & Regulation, held on Feb. 8, 2013, where I gave a talk based on views
expressed in this Article.
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employees are making business decisions. In psychological terms, the
internal model of compliance would ensure that the policies and
standards do not “fade” in employee decision making. Thus a
compliance officer, rather than being only a transcriber of rules and
monitor of their enforcement, would be an educator about policies,
standards, and the appropriate firm and industry culture, as well as
an advisor and counselor concerning how they should inform daily
employee decisions.
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INTRODUCTION
A key participant in the reform of broker-dealers and other
financial firms in response to the financial crisis of 2007–2008 is the
compliance officer, whose basic task is to ensure that a financial firm
and its employees comply with applicable laws and regulations. The
1122
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compliance officer typically occupies a middle position between
business and regulation. On the one hand, the officer does not
engage in the firm’s business, but belongs to one of its oversight
functions, like accounting, internal control, or legal. On the other
hand, the compliance officer is not a regulator or an official of a selfregulatory organization (“SRO”), 1 although he or she may often
have spent part of his or her career with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) or the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (“FINRA”). 2 He or she thus does not have the complete
independence from the securities business that comes with the
government or self-regulatory role.
This Article argues that the compliance officer should play a
major role in the ongoing reform of broker-dealers and other
financial firms. This role is facilitated by the fact that compliance is
now well established and accepted in financial firms and compliance
officers are close to decision making at all levels of a firm. In the
interest of keeping the discussion manageable, this Article focuses on
compliance only in financial firms regulated by the SEC as brokerdealers under the Exchange Act and by FINRA, which is the SRO
for these firms. 3 The contention of this Article is that the role of
compliance must be rethought and reoriented if it is to contribute
1. Self-regulatory organizations are essentially organizations of financial professionals
or markets authorized under federal securities laws to regulate their own participants, with this
regulation subject to the oversight of the Securities and Exchange Commission. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(26) (2012).
2. FINRA, which is a union of the former self-regulatory arms of the National
Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”) and the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”), is a
registered securities association under section 15A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
“Exchange Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (2012). On the movement of lawyers and others
between financial regulators and the financial industry, see Michael Smallberg, Dangerous
Liaisons: Revolving Door at SEC Creates Risk of Regulatory Capture, PROJECT ON
GOVERNMENT
OVERSIGHT
2
(Feb.
11,
2013)
http://www.pogo.org/ourwork/reports/2013/dangerous-liaisons-revolving-door-at-sec.html (“The movement of
people to and from the financial industry is a key feature of the SEC, and it has the potential to
influence the agency’s culture and values.”). But see David Zaring, Against Being Against the
Revolving Door, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 507 (2013) (questioning the criticism of this
phenomenon).
3. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2012). A broker-dealer typically conducts both the functions
of a “broker,” which acts as an agent for others in securities transactions, 15 U.S.C. §
78c(a)(4), and a “dealer,” which generally is in the business of making markets in securities, 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5). However, this analysis could apply equally to compliance in other financial
intermediaries, particularly registered investment advisers and swap dealers, for, as discussed
below, broker-dealer compliance has been in existence for a long time and thus has served as a
model for compliance in these other financial firms.
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fully to the reform. Compliance officers now help ensure that firms
and their employees comply with the numerous laws and regulations
governing them and their activities, primarily by producing detailed
compliance procedures and policies and then by revising them and
monitoring compliance with them. 4 The policies and procedures
direct the conduct of employees by surrounding them with a web of
detailed instructions, procedures, supervisory review, reporting,
oversight, and investigation, where necessary. This approach, which
is based on a well-established “external” model of direction,
discipline, and surveillance, is necessary to prevent self-interested and
opportunistic conduct by financial firm employees. Certainly, when
individuals are told what to do and know that they are being
watched, their misconduct is reduced. 5 Indeed, in a theoretical sense,
the most effective disciplinary system would be to have compliance
officers everywhere, scrutinizing and reviewing every client
interaction and transaction. However, this approach is impossible in
the real world, given resource constraints in firms.
There are other, even more significant, problems with the
external approach to compliance. The imposition of detailed rules of
conduct enforced by compliance officers reinforces the distinction
between the business of the firm, on the one hand, and law and
regulation on the other. Under the external model of compliance,
the securities business is the world of profit-making through talent,
discretion, and effort, whereas compliance is viewed by brokers as
restricting this creativity and profitability through its rules,
procedures, and monitoring. It is true that the rules have become
ingrained into the securities business and the Chief Compliance
Officer (“CCO”), which is required by regulation, has become a
significant managerial position. 6 However, there is a risk that
employees follow only the letter of compliance and even at times
ignore it, albeit at their peril, for, even in the routines of their
business, they understand that the rules are different from, and
necessarily secondary to, the actual securities business. Moreover,
compliance officers monitor whether employees fulfill the obligations
imposed by securities laws and regulations as well as SRO rules, and
4. See infra Part I.B.
5. See Gary R. Weaver & Linda Klebe Treviño, Compliance and Values Oriented Ethics
Programs: Influences on Employees’ Attitudes and Behavior, 9 BUS. ETHICS Q. 315, 329 (1999)
(discussing the benefits of a compliance program).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 46–47 (discussing FINRA Rule 3013).
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they investigate and report violations of these rules and laws, which
can lead to criminal or civil enforcement by the Justice Department
(“DOJ”), the SEC, and FINRA. 7 In these situations, compliance
becomes part of enforcement and prosecution, which further
distances compliance officers from other firm employees, who see
them as threatening their livelihood and even their liberty.
A significant problem with the external approach is that it
“crowds out” another model that is necessary to achieve the most
effective compliance. The ideal broker-dealer compliance orientation
would promote internal, in addition to external, compliance. The
goal of the internal approach is to have firm employees internalize
the policies of the laws, regulations, and professional and ethical
standards so that they come into the foreground when the
employees are making business decisions. In psychological terms, the
internal model of compliance would ensure that the policies and
standards do not “fade” in employee decision making, which fading
could occur even when firm employees are outwardly following
compliance procedures because other concerns influence their
decision making. 8 Thus, this internal approach means that
compliance would come from within the employee and be part of his
or her mindset and personal identity. Rather than being a transcriber
of rules and monitor of their enforcement, a compliance officer
would be an educator about policies, standards, and the appropriate
firm and industry culture, as well as an advisor and counselor
concerning how rules can be applied in daily employee decisions in
the firm.
This reorientation of broker-dealer compliance to develop
internal compliance is critical for the continued growth and
development of finance. Finance allows capital to move to its best
use and to address, through new financial products, risks facing all of
us. 9 The financial system appears to work best when entrepreneurs
and financial institutions, such as broker-dealers, compete with their
7. See infra Part II.A.
8. See MAX H. BAZERMAN & ANN E. TENBRUNSEL, BLIND SPOTS: WHY WE FAIL TO
DO WHAT’S RIGHT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 69–70 (2011) (discussing “ethical” fading,
where ethical dimensions of a decision “fade” at the time of decision making); Ann E.
Tenbrunsel & Kristen Smith-Crowe, Ethical Decision Making: Where We’ve Been and Where
We’re Going, 2 ACAD. MGT. ANNALS 545, 561 (2008) (discussing literature on the subject of
ethical fading).
9. See ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER: RISK IN THE 21ST CENTURY
99–104 (2003) (discussing beneficial financial innovations).
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various products and services, with the inevitable successes and
failures that come with our economic system. In the last thirty years,
however, certain financial firms, generally the financial
conglomerates that included the largest broker-dealers, upended this
system by externalizing and socializing the risks of their failure. 10
This situation in finance culminated in the 2007–2008 financial
crisis, which started at the margins of finance with subprime lending
done by unregulated financial firms, an activity that was then taken
up by major financial institutions attracted by its profitability. 11 In
the worst financial crisis in modern memory, many of the largest
financial firms failed or had to be rescued by the government;
indeed, the financial system nearly collapsed. 12 This crisis disrupted
the essential back-and-forth flow of resources from investors to
capital raisers, with the result that the federal government had to
provide funds to financial institutions and market participants. 13 The
ensuing downturn in the economy created social and political unrest
when the unemployed and the underemployed were discontented
with, and blamed financial firms for, their difficult situation. 14
10. The “classic” work setting forth this perspective is SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK,
13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 189–222
(2010). See generally SHEILA BAIR, BULL BY THE HORNS: FIGHTING TO SAVE MAIN STREET
FROM WALL STREET AND WALL STREET FROM ITSELF 52–57 (2012) (discussing the mortgagebased products sold before the crisis).
11. For one narrative of how the growth in subprime lending and its toxic securities
gradually spread throughout the financial system, see THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL
AND ECONOMIC CRISIS OF THE UNITED STATES 3–24 (2011).
12. For a chronology of the financial crisis, see THE PANIC OF 2008: CAUSES,
CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM 22–35 (Lawrence E. Mitchell & Arthur E.
Wilmarth, Jr., eds. 2010). For a vivid, journalistic review of it, see generally ANDREW ROSS
SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON
FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM—AND THEMSELVES (2009).
13. See, e.g., Viral V. Acharya et al., A Bird’s-Eye View: The Financial Crisis of 2007–
2009: Causes and Remedies, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED
SYSTEM 1, 10–11 (Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson, eds. 2009).
14. For a view on the origins of social disparities that appeared in the financial crisis,
written in the middle of the crisis, see generally CHARLES R. MORRIS, THE TRILLION DOLLAR
MELTDOWN: EASY MONEY, HIGH ROLLERS, AND THE GREAT CREDIT CRASH 137–58 (2008).
The “Occupy Wall Street” movement comes to mind, with its protest against the “1%,” which
owns most of the assets and receives most of the income in the United States. See OCCUPY
WALL STREET, http://occupywallst.org (last visited Mar. 5, 2013); see also Josh Bivens &
Lawrence Mishel, The Pay of Corporate Executives and Financial Professionals as Evidence of
Rents in Top 1 Percent Incomes, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 57, 65–66 (Summer 2013) (discussing
“rent shifting,” i.e., overcompensation, as an explanation for the growth of income in the
financial sector).
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In reaction, Congress produced the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”) and
regulators issued voluminous regulations based on it. 15 Not
surprisingly, the creation of new financial regulators, 16 or new offices
within existing ones, 17 accompanied this growth in law and
regulation. SROs, particularly FINRA, enhanced their own
regulatory and enforcement capabilities as well. 18 This legal and
regulatory activity resulted in an enormous amount of new
regulation being placed on financial firms, including broker-dealers.
Critics of Dodd-Frank contended that legislators, regulators, and
SROs had imposed excessive regulatory, and thus compliance,
burdens upon the firms that would hurt firms’ flexibility and
competitiveness. 19
Highly visible, well-functioning compliance, which helps firm
employees make decisions animated by legal policies and professional
and ethical standards, could save broker-dealers from this cycle of
15. See Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). This Act and its regulations will
be discussed from time to time in the Article. Among other things, this law brought within
regulation activities like swaps and market participants (like hedge fund advisors) that had
previously been unregulated, and it changed, through means such as the controversial “Volcker
Rule,” how financial firms conducted their business. Title VII of Dodd-Frank regulated swap
markets and swap market participants; Section 403 of Title IV of Dodd-Frank eliminated, by
amending 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b), an exemption from regulation as an investment adviser that
hedge fund advisers traditionally relied upon; and the “Volcker Rule,” section 619 of Title VI
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851) prohibits bank holding companies, banks, and their affiliates
and subsidiaries from engaging in proprietary trading or sponsoring or investing in hedge or
private equity funds, subject to certain controversial exceptions.
16. Dodd-Frank, for example, created the Financial Stability Oversight Council
(“FSOC”), which is designed, among other things, to monitor the overall soundness of the
financial system. See Dodd-Frank Act tit I §§ 111, 112, codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5321–22.
The Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection was also created within the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System (the “Federal Reserve”) to regulate financial products and
services from a consumer protection perspective. See Dodd-Frank Act tit X §§ 1011, 1021,
codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5491, 5511.
17. For example, the SEC created a new Division of Economic and Risk Analysis in
2009 “to integrate financial economics and rigorous data analytics into the core missions of the
SEC.” See Economic & Risk Analysis, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin.shtml (last modified Mar. 13, 2014).
18. For a discussion of several FINRA actions following the crisis, see FINRA, 2008
YEAR IN REVIEW AND ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT: REFORMING REGULATION TO BETTER
PROTECT INVESTORS 5 (2009) (letter of FINRA CEO, Richard G. Ketchum).
19. See, e.g., REPUBLICAN STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES,
FAILING TO END “TOO BIG TO FAIL”: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT FOUR
YEARS LATER 88–90 (July 2014). By contrast, one could contend that, given their misconduct,
broker-dealers and other financial firms need more, not less, regulation.
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crisis followed by increased regulatory burdens. It could convince
legislators, regulators, and, most important of all, the public that
broker-dealers contribute an important social role (i.e., capital raising)
and are not in business only for their employees’ self-interest. Firms
would thus need fewer express rules of conduct. 20 Moreover, a
compliance approach that changes the perspective of firm employees
so that they consider policies behind the rules, which include the longterm stability of the financial system and customer confidence in the
markets, would help employees understand the potential dangers of
certain financial products and services. It could have the added virtue
of preventing the loss of investor and public confidence in the financial
markets and, perhaps, the reemergence of the kinds of risks and crises
that threaten the entire financial system. 21
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief history of
compliance in broker-dealers and its amplified importance over
recent years as laws and regulations affecting these firms have
increased. Part I then discusses the role and functions of the typical
compliance department in a broker-dealer, generally as the producer,
administrator, and enforcer of firm rules reflecting this ever-growing
number of laws, regulations, and professional standards.
Part II first offers an account of the origins of the current
“external” compliance orientation, which is based upon employee
control and monitoring. This orientation is designed to dictate in
detail the conduct of a broker and to surround him or her with a
web of oversight, so as to make the broker both productive and
disciplined. Part II relies on insights about the origin and purpose of
this disciplinary approach, particularly those by the French
20. Other reforms, such as a change in business school education, would be useful, but
they are outside the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Robert A. Giacalone & Mark D. Promislo,
Broken When Entering: The Stigmatization of Goodness and Business Ethics Education, 12 ACAD.
MGT. LEARNING & EDUC. 86 (2013) (explaining how, before they enter business schools,
many business students have been taught to belittle ethics and to espouse materialistic values).
21. This is systemic risk, which is simply a risk to the entire financial system. See LISSA L.
BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES:
CASES AND MATERIALS 156 (4th ed. 2011). The kinds of problems that lead to systemic risk
may arise slowly and from the ground up. The financial crisis was a long time coming and the
problems in the financial system that led to it were apparent to many before it emerged. Thus,
systemic and other massive disasters are not always due to unexpected, unforeseeable events,
popularly known as “black swans,” defined by Nassim Taleb as events that are outside the
realm of expectation, with a large impact, that generate an after-the-fact explanation. See
NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE
xvii–xviii (2007).
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philosopher Michel Foucault, who saw it as a technique of social
control that emerged during the Enlightenment and that was applied
first in the prisons and then in major social activities. It
acknowledges that this approach contributes to compliance, as it
constrains employees to act in accordance with the law and checks
their misconduct through its monitoring.
Part II then uses social psychological and organizational research
to point to several problems with external compliance. One problem
is that, as noted above, its heavily rule- and procedure-based
orientation may lead compliance to become a routine, which may
cause firm employees to act in accordance with the form, not the
spirit, of the rules and standards. Moreover, although compliance
with the law has become ingrained in the securities business, the
external approach inevitably makes brokers think of compliance as
secondary in importance to business, particularly since a firm must
leave considerable discretion to its employees in their dealings with
clients. Thus, in the worst cases, this kind of compliance can be
ignored or gamed, which, in a perverse way, contributes to illegal
and unethical practices in these organizations. More significantly, it
crowds out other approaches to compliance, particularly the internal
approach, because individuals meeting external compliance
requirements may feel no need to understand and to be motivated
by the legal policies and ethical standards underlying the
requirements. Part II then observes that, although regulators and
SROs advocate a compliance orientation that encourages conduct in
accordance with legal policies and professional standards—the
“culture of compliance”—they constantly reinforce the model of allencompassing external control over firm employees.
Part II next observes that there were many cases of failure of
compliance in the financial crisis, for illegal and unethical practices
occurred in firms with robust external compliance. This suggests that
the external compliance model has serious limitations. Yet reforms
following the crisis have reinforced the external approach and even
expanded its mission by adding to the laws and rules it must translate
into firm procedures, by enhancing regulatory examinations, and by
extending the external control model to other financial institutions.
This Part emphasizes how the increase in compliance burdens on
broker-dealers may undermine the flexibility and capacity for
innovation that is the hallmark of a beneficial finance.
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Part III offers a reorientation in the compliance approach:
compliance must be transformed so as to downplay, but maintain,
the external perspective and to reemphasize an internal approach that
promotes the goals, policies, and standards of the federal securities
laws and the broker-dealer profession in employee decision making.
The goal of compliance and compliance officers would be to change
the decision framework of brokers so that they would consider the
goals, policies, and standards in their business activities. In a word,
the compliance officer would become an advisor and counselor to
the firm, reminding brokers and other firm employees of the social
purposes of their activities. This approach finds support in current
social psychological and organizational research on ethical and prosocial decision making. 22 Part III reviews ways in which compliance
officers can promote this internal compliance and also contends that
this changed emphasis requires the assistance of FINRA and the
SEC. It recognizes that FINRA and the SEC would resist this
change, as it differs from their established approach and risks making
them appear to be soft towards the securities industry. The Part then
discusses, as a way to overcome their resistance to the reorientation,
how the success of the internal approach could be assessed and
measured in a multi-year pilot program. It recommends that FINRA
propose the reorientation in new supplementary material to an
existing supervisory rule, which will provide the reorientation with
express regulatory authority, as well as allow commenters to identify
potential problems with the approach. The Part concludes by
discussing ways that FINRA and the SEC could promote internal
compliance and by making several suggestions about how FINRA
and the SEC could lessen the enforcement role of compliance, which
is an impediment to the internal approach. Part IV concludes.
I. THE FOUNDATIONS AND PRESENT CONFIGURATION OF
COMPLIANCE
A. The Statutory and Regulatory Basis for Compliance in BrokerDealers
The current state of compliance in broker-dealers is, to a great
extent, a product of a broker-dealer’s legal responsibility for its
personnel that is imposed under the Exchange Act and the common
22. See infra Part III.A.
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law. 23 Compliance means that a broker-dealer and its employees must
conduct their business in accordance with their legal, regulatory, and
professional obligations, which generally, but not exclusively, arise
under federal securities laws and regulations and FINRA rules.
Section 15(b)(4)(D) of the Exchange Act empowers the SEC to
discipline a broker-dealer for, among other things, the willful
violation of, or the inability to comply with, the federal securities
laws or their regulations by the broker-dealer itself or by any person
associated with such broker-dealer. 24 This means that if an employee
of a broker-dealer willfully violates the securities laws or regulations,
the broker-dealer is subject to SEC discipline under the statutory
provision, which could include suspension of its registration for up
to twelve months or even the revocation of its registration, which
would mean that the broker-dealer could no longer engage in the
brokerage business. In addition to this statute, the SEC, as enforcer
of the federal securities laws, also used the common law doctrine of
respondeat superior to make a firm responsible for the acts of its
employees engaged in the securities business. 25 Accordingly, the
statute, together with the common law obligation, gives brokerdealers an incentive to supervise their employees to ensure that they
comply with applicable laws and regulations. Supervisors and
employees need to know what compliance with the laws and

23. The focus here is on the industry-specific origins of compliance within brokerdealers. These compliance systems have been influenced and shaped by factors leading to
compliance in business (particularly publicly traded) firms. General business compliance is the
subject of a rich scholarly literature. See generally Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate
Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 958–75 (2009) and accompanying notes (discussing origins
of corporate compliance and referencing much of the significant contributions to this
literature); Michele DeStefano, Creating a Culture of Compliance: Why Departmentalization
May Not Be the Answer, 10 HASTINGS BUS. L. J. 71, 88–103 (2014).
24. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(D) (2012). “Associated person” is defined in Section
3(a)(18) of the Exchange Act to include the following:
any partner, officer, director, or branch manager of such broker or dealer (or any
person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions), any person
directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under common control with
such broker or dealer, or any employee of such broker or dealer . . .
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(18) (2012). This definition sweeps in all those who engage in the
securities business in a broker-dealer as well as controlling persons, but excludes clerical and
ministerial employees.
25. See generally Task Force on Broker-Dealer Supervision and Compliance of the
Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Broker-Dealer Supervision of Registered
Representatives and Branch Office Operations, 44 BUS. LAW. 1361, 1363–64 (1989) (discussing
the SEC’s initial legal theories for imposing supervisory liability upon broker-dealers).
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regulations entails so that compliance and the accompanying
supervision can be properly accomplished. The compliance function
or department of a broker-dealer accomplishes this task.
Section 15(b)(4)(D) proved to be an inadequate provision for
the SEC to enforce legal compliance by broker-dealers and their
employees. By its terms, the provision allows the SEC to discipline
only the firm, not the violating employee. Moreover, it does not
provide for discipline of firm supervisors who fail to prevent the
violations. The Securities Acts Amendments of 1964 remedied these
problems by adding sections 15(b)(4)(E) and 15(b)(6), which made
supervisory liability explicit in the Exchange Act and which thus gave
a major impetus to compliance. 26 Under section 15(b)(4)(E), a
broker-dealer is subject to sanctions if, among other things, it or an
associated person willfully “failed reasonably to supervise, with a
view to preventing” such violation, another person who committed
the violation. 27 This amendment makes the broker-dealer explicitly
liable for its own and its associated persons’ failure to supervise.
Furthermore, section 15(b)(6) provides that an associated person
who, among other things, commits a supervisory violation is also
liable and subject to SEC discipline. 28 Under this latter provision, the
SEC can discipline branch managers and other supervisors in a
broker-dealer for their failure to supervise employees under their
authority. These statutory additions reinforce the need for a firm
function (i.e., compliance) that would assist individual supervisors,
who have personal supervisory liability, in fulfilling their supervisory
obligations. Moreover, these provisions, which add to the
enforcement authority of the SEC, have shaped the orientation of
compliance so that, as discussed below, it becomes a subject of SEC
and FINRA enforcement.
Section 15(b)(4)(E) provides both the firm and, through section
15(b)(6), firm supervisors with defenses to an SEC charge of
supervisory liability. It states that “no person shall be deemed to
have failed reasonably to supervise any other person” if, first, there
were “established procedures[] and a system for applying” them
“which would reasonably be expected to prevent and to detect,
26. Pub. L. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565, 571–72 (1964) (15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(b)(5)(E), (b)(7)
(1964)). These provisions are now codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(b)(4)(E), (b)(6).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(6) (2012). This section imposes the supervisory obligation
through a cross-reference to section 78(b)(4)(E) (2012).
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insofar as practicable,” any securities law violations by the supervised
person; 29 and, second, if the supervisor has “reasonably discharged”
her or his duties under the procedures and system “without
reasonable cause to believe” that these “procedures and system were
not being complied with.” 30 This foregoing language means that, to
offer the statutory defense, a firm has to have well-drafted
supervisory procedures for ensuring that the firm and all its
employees comply with securities laws and regulations as well as a
system, which implies the resources and responsible people, to
implement these procedures. Moreover, the firm and its supervisors
have to demonstrate that they fulfilled their responsibilities under
these procedures and system and, therefore, that the procedures and
system were not just “window dressing.” 31
This statutory defense to an SEC charge of failure to supervise is
clearly a roadmap for the growth of compliance, since there would
have to be a firm compliance department or group that would be
responsible for drafting the supervisory procedures and assisting in
the implementation of the supervisory system. Moreover, compliance
officers would be critical in ensuring that the last prong of the
statutory defense is satisfied: that the procedures and the system are
being followed. They would accomplish this task through their
monitoring for legal compliance and following up on any problem or
potential problem (known in the trade as a “red flag”) 32 that surfaces
in a firm, which could suggest a legal violation and thus potentially a
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E)(i) (2012).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E)(ii) (2012).
31. See id.; see also RALPH C. FERRARA ET AL., STOCKBROKER SUPERVISION: MANAGING
STOCKBROKERS AND SURVIVING SANCTIONS 15 (1989) (discussing, in general terms, the
elements of the statutory defense from the SEC’s perspective); John H. Walsh, Right the First
Time: Regulation, Quality, and Preventive Compliance in the Securities Industry, 1997 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 165, 174–77 (discussing origins of the statutory defense).
32. A “red flag” is an unusual event or practice that could be a sign of a securities
violation and, therefore, one that must be monitored or investigated. See, e.g., FINRA,
Regulatory Notice 08-18, Unauthorized Proprietary Trading (2008) (identifying “red flags”
for improper conduct by proprietary traders in firms); In re Gutfreund et al., Exchange Act
Release No. 31554, 52 SEC Docket 2849, 1992 WL 362753 at *12 (Dec. 3, 1992) (“red
flags” are “‘suggestions’ of irregularity”). So ingrained is this notion in brokerage culture that
parties engaging in inappropriate conduct and attempting to avoid detection themselves
sometimes state that they do not want their conduct to raise any “red flags.” See In re
Guggenheim Sec., LLC, FINRA Letter of Acceptance, Waiver and Consent No.
20100226640003 6 (Oct. 11, 2012) (traders hiding improper transactions write the following
email: “‘this is not about the money, but really about not raising any more red flags on a
settlement that already caused so much trouble for everyone.’”).
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supervisory one. In sum, a firm has to have a compliance department,
or at least a compliance officer, devoted to creating a well-functioning
supervisory system to take advantage of the statutory defense, which is
critical since, under sections 15(b)(4)(E) and 15(b)(6), the firm and
its supervisors face explicit supervisory liability.
The SEC has in fact used its interpretation of a firm’s supervisory
obligations under section 15(b)(4)(E), as well as of the statutory
defense, to push for the development of compliance, often through
opinions issued in administrative proceedings against brokerdealers. 33 In certain significant cases, it found that securities law
violations occurring in a broker-dealer indicated that the firm and its
supervisors had failed in their supervisory duties by not having an
adequate compliance function. 34 As a result of the proceedings, the
SEC required a prosecuted firm to expand its compliance
department, and this outcome became in turn a model for other
firms. In this vein, a major SEC goal has been to require that a
broker-dealer have a compliance department and adequate staff
whose size would be proportional to the size of the firm and the
growth and complexity of the firm’s activities. 35 In this way,
compliance officers would be able to oversee each part of the firm’s
business. Moreover, the SEC demands that compliance officers have
autonomy within the firm; officers would have their own reporting
structure and lines of authority apart from those of the firm’s
business. They also need the power to report their concerns about
problems in transactions and new business development to senior
33. The SEC can bring actions against regulated firms, such as broker-dealers, in its own
administrative proceedings before administrative law judges, whose decisions the SEC itself can
review. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2 (2012). On the rules governing the proceedings, see 17 C.F.R.
§§ 201.200–490 (2013).
34. See, e.g., In re Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 22755, 1986
WL 626342 (Jan. 2, 1986) (discussing problems with respect to the powers of the compliance
department). The SEC might especially make this point if the firm had expanded its product
offerings or entered into new business lines without similarly expanding compliance. See, e.g.,
In re Prudential Sec., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 33082, 1993 WL 430273 (Oct. 21,
1993) (in this case, the broker-dealer entered into the sale of limited partnership interests,
which activity was not adequately supervised). For a recent example, see In re TD Ameritrade,
Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 63829 (Feb. 3, 2011), available at http:/www.sec.gov
(discussing supervisory and compliance failures in the firm’s marketing of a new fund that was
misrepresented in the sales process as a money market fund).
35. For example, in the Prudential administrative proceedings, the SEC insisted that this
broker-dealer have regional compliance directors, who would report to the chief compliance
officer, in specific regions where Prudential had branches. See Exchange Act Release No.
33082, supra note 34, at *27.
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firm decision makers and to have firm supervisors explicitly address
these concerns. 36
36. See Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 22755, supra note 34
(faulting firm for failing to follow directions of compliance as to dismissal of rogue brokers).
See also FERRARA ET AL., supra note 31, at 19–27 (citing SEC decisions on this subject). These
SEC administrative decisions also raise an important issue about the relationship between
supervision and compliance that has not been definitively resolved. Supervision refers to the
power of one person over another in a firm’s chain of command, which includes, as discussed
above, the obligation to ensure that the supervised employee complies with securities laws and
regulations. It is often typified by the power of the supervisor to control the actions of, and
ultimately to dismiss, an employee. See In re Huff, Exchange Act Release No. 29017, 1991
WL 296561, at *9 (Mar. 28, 1991). In a seminal SEC decision on this subject, Gutfreund et
al., supra note 32, the SEC made the following observation in the context of discussing the
supervisory responsibilities of legal and compliance officers, which offers a broader view than
the control standard:
Employees of brokerage firms who have legal or compliance responsibilities do not
become “supervisors” for purposes of Sections 15(b)(4)(E) and 15(b)(6) solely
because they occupy those positions. Rather, determining if a particular person is a
“supervisor” depends on whether, under the facts and circumstances of a particular
case, that person has a requisite degree of responsibility, ability or authority to affect
the conduct of the employee whose behavior is at issue.
Id. at *15 (emphasis added). Compliance in a broker-dealer is not, without more, part of the
supervisory structure and a compliance officer is not a supervisor, again without more facts,
such as that a compliance officer has additional, business line responsibilities. Rather, as
explained above, compliance makes effective supervision possible. Compliance officers are not
themselves supervisors because they do not hire and fire employees nor do they tell others
what to do or make disciplinary decisions when a violation is found—those actions are for the
supervisors. However, the SEC has held that, once a compliance or legal officer has a sufficient
position of influence within a firm, he or she may have the responsibility, with other
supervisors, for taking appropriate action in response to misconduct. This action could include,
in extreme circumstances such as when the main supervisors do not adequately respond to the
misconduct, escalating the matter to the board of directors, resigning or reporting the problem
to regulatory authorities. See id. at *16.
This issue has recently come to the foreground mainly because of a case involving a
disciplinary action against a general counsel who was also the CCO of a broker-dealer. See In re
Urban, SEC Initial Decision Release No. 402 (Sept. 8, 2010). In that case, Urban attempted
to take action against a rogue broker, who engaged in numerous legal violations, including
unauthorized trading in client accounts and doing trades for a stock manipulator. Urban urged
that the broker be dismissed, but he was overruled by the head of retail sales who agreed to
supervise the broker personally. The broker ultimately left the firm in the wake of numerous
customer problems that resulted in a significant financial loss to the broker-dealer. Urban was
charged with a supervisory violation. The SEC took a position on supervision that was broader
than the two traditional theories of “control” and “affect,” since it would find supervisory
liability when a person, such as a compliance officer, has “authority” in the firm, i.e., is listened
to. See id. at 46. The administrative law judge ruled that Urban was in fact a supervisor, but
that he had fulfilled his supervisory responsibilities. At the urging of its Enforcement Division,
the SEC declined to affirm summarily the judge’s ruling, stating, among other things, that it
needed to consider whether it was enough for Urban to report problems to the supervisor of
the broker or whether he should have escalated the matter to the firm’s chief executive officer
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Similarly, SRO supervisory requirements significantly spur the
growth of compliance in firms. The Exchange Act requires SROs to
enforce compliance with federal securities laws and regulations, as
well as compliance with their own rules, by their members and to
have rules designed to “prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and
practices, [and] to promote just and equitable principles of trade.” 37
To achieve these purposes, the NYSE and the NASD (FINRA’s
predecessor), as well as other SROs, historically required their
members to have a supervisory system in place to ensure that their
associated persons were properly supervised so as to comply with the
law and rules. 38
Over the years, the SRO requirements for supervisory systems
have become extremely detailed and specify how a broker-dealer is to
conduct supervision, as opposed to providing a defense to
supervisory liability, as is the case with section 15(b)(4)(E) of the
Exchange Act. FINRA requires each of its members to have “a
system to supervise the activities of each registered representative,
registered principal, 39 and other associated person that is reasonably
and its board of directors. See In re Urban, SEC Admin. Proc. File No. 3-13655 (Dec. 7,
2010). Eventually, the SEC dismissed the proceedings because, with three members recusing
themselves, the other two split on the decision. See id. The case raised concern among
practitioners that compliance officers were being inappropriately pulled into the supervisory
structure of a firm. See, e.g., David C. Prince, NSCP Files Amicus Brief with SEC in Theodore W.
Urban Case, NSCP CURRENTS 1 (Nov./Dec. 2010) (discussing position of the National
Society of Compliance Professionals on this case). The SEC staff recently asserted that the
administrative law judge’s decision is “of no effect,” in light of the dismissal of the action. See
SEC Division of Trading & Markets, Frequently Asked Questions about Liability of
Compliance and Legal Personnel at Broker-Dealers under Sections 15(b)(4) and 15(b)(6) of
the Exchange Act 4 (Sept. 30, 2013), available at http:www.sec.gov divisions/ marketreg/faqcco-supervision-093013.htm.
37. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-3(b)(2), (6) (2012) (for securities associations); 15 U.S.C. §§
78f(b)(1), (5) (2012) (for exchanges). The SEC reviews the rules in connection with the
registration of an association or an exchange, as well as ongoing proposed rule changes or ones
initiated by the SEC. See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a)–(c).
38. The then NASD required in Article III section 27 of its Rules of Fair Practice that
its members have written supervisory procedures to ensure the supervision of each associated
person. In 1989, the Section was expanded to include assignment of each associated person to
the supervision of a principal, an annual compliance review, and special characterization of
certain offices (Offices of Supervisory Jurisdiction or “OSJs”) where major client activities are
conducted. See generally Task Force on Broker-Dealer Supervision and Compliance, supra note
25, at 1389–94 (for a summary of these rules).
39. “Principals” are associated persons “who are actively engaged in the management of
the member’s investment banking or securities business, including supervision, solicitation,
conduct of business or the training of persons associated with a member for any of these
functions are designated as principals.” See FINRA, Registration of Principals-1021, NASD
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designed to achieve compliance” with securities laws and regulations
and FINRA rules. 40 Among other things, the system requires a
broker-dealer to have written procedures for the supervision (written
supervisory procedures or “WSPs”) of each of its securities
businesses and associated persons, to designate supervisors for each
regulated business, to have annual compliance reviews for each
registered representative and principal, to have internal inspections of
all offices, to have a principal review the transactions and
correspondence with the public of registered representatives relating
to their securities business, and to investigate the character and
qualifications of any associated person. 41 In other words, while the
duty of supervision under the Exchange Act is general, as one would
expect in the foundational statute, the FINRA supervisory
requirements are both general and detailed. Compliance officers are
needed to help the firm and its supervisors administer the required
supervisory system.
Moreover, since FINRA rules govern each securities business
activity and generally dictate how it is to be conducted in accordance
with the applicable law and regulation, nearly every FINRA rule has
supervisory and, therefore, compliance implications. 42 Each year
RULES,
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=4254
&element_id=3579&highlight=registration#r4254 (last visited Aug. 24, 2014) (Rule 1021(b)).
As a result of the consolidation of the NASD and the regulatory arm of the NYSE, a new FINRA
rulebook, combining the rules of each of these SROs, is being prepared and implemented.
Therefore, current FINRA rules include some NASD rules, some NYSE rules (which apply only
to broker-dealers formerly regulated by the NYSE), and the new FINRA rules.
40. See FINRA, Supervision-3010, NASD RULES, http://finra.complinet.com
/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=3717 (last visited Aug. 24, 2014)
(Rule 3010(a)). FINRA proposed to create a new FINRA Rule 3110 to replace NASD Rule
3010 (as well as a new FINRA Rule 3120 to replace NASD Rule 3012 discussed below). See
Notice of Filing of a Proposed Rule Change to Adopt Rules Regarding Supervision in the
Consolidated FINRA Rulebook, Exchange Act Release No. 69902, 78 Fed. Reg. 40,792 (July
8, 2013). After amending its proposal in response to industry and other comments, FINRA
received the SEC’s approval on its new rules. See Self-Regulatory Organizations; Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc.; Order Granting Approval of a Proposed Rule Change To
Adopt Rules Regarding Supervision in the Consolidated FINRA Rulebook, as Modified by
Amendment No. 1, Exchange Act Release No. 71,179, 78 Fed. Reg. 79,542 (Dec. 30, 2013).
FINRA has determined that this rule change will take effect on December 1, 2014. See
FINRA, Consolidated Supervision Rules, Regulatory Notice 14-10 (Mar. 2014). Since the
new supervisory rules maintain the general content and overall orientation of the current rules,
which are discussed below, the Article will focus on the FINRA rules currently in force.
41. See FINRA, supra note 40, at §§ 3010(a)–(e).
42. A good example is FINRA’s recently promulgated suitability rule, FINRA Rule
2111. See FINRA, Know your Customer and Suitability, REG. NOTICE NO. 11-02 (Jan. 2011)
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there are new FINRA rules or the existing rules are modified in
response to the development of new businesses and products in
broker-dealers or to the imposition of new legal obligations imposed
upon these firms. These changes reinforce the need for a brokerdealer to have a compliance division or group that can keep track of
all of the legal and regulatory duties of the firm and associated
persons and that can help the firm’s employees satisfy their
obligations, and the firm’s supervisors their supervisory duties
through guidance, monitoring, and follow-up.
Specific SRO supervisory rules promulgated in reaction to
scandals in the brokerage industry gave an additional impetus to the
growth of compliance. In 2004, the SROs issued two compliancerelated rules after a notable failure of supervision in several brokerdealers where, undetected, a single broker misappropriated over
$100 million in customer money over fifteen years. 43 One of these
rules was (to use the FINRA example) NASD Rule 3012, which
requires that a firm have one or more principals who establish
supervisory controls to test its supervisory system on a yearly basis in
order to assess its compliance effectiveness and identify the need for
additional WSPs. 44 Under the Rule, the responsible principal or
principals establish the controls, conduct the testing, create
additional WSPs to respond to weaknesses revealed by the testing,
and annually report to a broker-dealer’s senior management about

(announcing SEC approval of the new rule and discussing it and its difference with the earlier
NASD version). Suitability is essentially a duty imposed on a broker when he or she
recommends an investment product or (under the new rule) an investment strategy to a
customer. Under the rule, a broker must understand what he or she is recommending (known
as “reasonable-basis suitability”) and make a determination that the product or strategy is
suitable for a particular client (“customer-specific suitability”). See id. at 2111.05. Compliance
of course must lay out the steps for a broker as to how he or she satisfies the suitability
requirement and how a supervisor reviews a broker’s transactions to see that he or she in fact
fulfilled these requirements for a given recommendation.
43. See Securities and Exchange Comm’n, Self-regulatory Organizations; Order
Approving Proposed Rule Change and Amendments No. 1 and 2 by National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to Internal Controls and Supervisory Control Amendments
and Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerating Approval of Amendment No. 3,
Exchange Act Release No. 49,883, 83 S.E.C. Docket 192, 2004 WL 1574002, at 1* (June
17, 2004) (recounting the case of Gruttadauria, the rogue broker).
44. See
FINRA,
Supervisory
Control
System-3012,
NASD
RULES,
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=3722
(NASD Rule 3012(a)(1)). FINRA is replacing NASD Rule 3012 by FINRA Rule 3120; see
also supra note 39.
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their findings. 45 This kind of supervisory control system and related
testing procedure increased the demand for compliance specialists
who understood supervisory and compliance systems, weaknesses in
those systems, and industry developments with respect to their
improvement. Even more specifically promoting compliance was the
second rule, FINRA Rule 3130 (formerly NASD Rule 3013), which
requires a firm to appoint at least one chief compliance officer
(“CCO”). 46 Under this Rule, a firm’s chief executive officer
(“CEO”) must certify annually that there are “in place processes to
establish, maintain, review, test and modify written compliance
policies and written supervisory procedures reasonably designed to
achieve compliance with” SRO rules and federal securities laws and
regulations. The CEO must also certify that he or she has had “one
or more meetings” with the CCO in the preceding 12 months to
discuss the processes. 47 This rule is both a regulatory
acknowledgment of the importance of compliance and an effort to
increase its visibility and authority in broker-dealers.
The Exchange Act requirements and SRO rules thus ensure that
compliance has become a specialized occupation within financial
firms. Compliance duties initially were often done by firm
supervisors with the help of in-house lawyers and outside counsel. 48
However, not surprisingly, compliance became an increasingly
specialized occupation, particularly in larger firms, as the SEC and
the SROs pushed them to have a compliance function that reflected
their size and activities. The increase in and complexity of financial
activities done by larger firms and the accompanying growth in laws
45. See NASD Rule 3012(a)(1), supra note 44.
46. See FINRA, Annual Certification of Compliance and Supervisory Processes-3130,
FINRA
RULES,
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403
&element_id=6286 (FINRA Rule 3130(a)). See also NASD, Annual Compliance Certification
and Designation of Chief Compliance Officer, Notice to Members 04-79, 2004 WL 2587763,
at *1 (Nov. 1, 2004) (“NASD Rule 3013 is intended to bolster attention to members’
compliance programs by requiring substantial and purposeful interaction between business and
compliance officers throughout the firm.”).
47. See FINRA Rule 3130(b), supra note 46. The Rule provides a “model” certification
for the CEO. See id. at Rule 3130(c).
48. See generally SECS. INDUS. ASS’N: COMPLIANCE & LEGAL DIV., WHITE PAPER ON
THE ROLE OF COMPLIANCE 1 (Oct. 2005). This compliance model, in fact, is still found in
small broker-dealers, which operate with fewer resources than do large firms and where, for
cost reasons, firm supervisors and other employees often wear multiple hats, including that of
the CCO. See id., at 2–3 (discussing different compliance needs and structure of small firms).
Smaller firms may also “outsource” some of their compliance tasks, but every firm must have a
chief compliance officer who is responsible for compliance.
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and regulations relating to them meant that firm supervisors could
no longer stay current with all of the legal, regulatory, and SRO
responsibilities of their firm and associated persons. 49 They thus had
to create and then rely upon a specialized group within the firm, the
compliance department, whose officers could devote their time and
efforts to producing and updating supervisory and compliance
procedures as well as ensure that their firm and its employees
operated in accordance with the law and regulation and that their
firm’s supervisors satisfied their supervisory obligations. This meant
that, as mentioned above and discussed further below, compliance
officers would produce and implement the WSPs dictating how an
activity should be conducted and supervised and would then
monitor the firm to see that the WSPs were followed.
Because FINRA rules mandate that every firm must have a CCO,
the number of brokerage employees now engaged primarily in
compliance is, at a minimum, equal to the number of firms. 50 Larger
49. See SEC. INDUS. AND FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, WHITE PAPER: THE EVOLVING ROLE OF
COMPLIANCE, at 18 (Mar. 2013) (discussing the various compliance models). An early writer
on broker-dealer compliance observed that it took shape as a specialized activity in the early
1960s. See O. Ray Vass, The Compliance Officer in Today’s Regulatory Environment, in
CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 3 (PLI Corporate Law and
Practice Course Handbook Ser. No. B4-6806 3).
50. There is different data on the number of broker-dealers. According to FINRA
statistics, which are the most recent, as of July 2014, there are 4137 member firms with
162,634 branch offices and 634,506 registered representatives. See FINRA STATISTICS &
DATA, http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/Statistics/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2014). As of the end
of 2012, the SEC put the number of broker-dealers at 4761. See SELECT SEC AND MARKET
DATA FISCAL 2013, at 21. As of the end of 2011, SIFMA put the number at 4527. See SEC.
INDUS. AND FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, 2012 FACT BOOK 25 (2012). The firms fall into four rough
categories: (i) the approximately 200 large firms, which historically were members of the New
York Stock Exchange, which have most of the customer assets and most of the industry’s
revenue and which are often in large financial groups; see id. at 28–34 (reporting data on
former NYSE firms), (ii) mid-sized, full-line firms, which are generally regional; (iii) discount
brokerage firms; and (iv) smaller firms, sometimes operating with only few brokers or
“registered representatives.” See SEC. INDUS. AND FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, FACT BOOK 2009, at 43
(2009) (discussing the kinds of broker-dealers). More recent data on firm size is not readily
available. SIFMA also provides a “heat map” of the location of broker-dealers in the United
States, which shows that they are concentrated in urban areas, with a significant percentage in
the New York City area. See SEC. INDUS. AND FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, BrokerDealer Heatmap,
Table 1.1 (updated as of Aug. 6, 2014), available at http://www.sifma.org/research
/statistics.aspx. Approximately a third of employees in the securities industry works in the tristate area of Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York. See U.S. Industry Employment, SEC.
INDUS. AND FIN. MKTS. ASS’N (as of Sept. 5, 2014), available at http://www.sifma.org/
research/statistics.aspx. Like all financial firms, broker-dealers have consolidated in the past
years, most recently due to the upheaval occasioned by the financial crisis. The number of
broker-dealers has been gradually declining since the middle of the 1990s. See SIFMA,
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firms are likely to have more compliance officers because their
businesses are diverse and complex and because they thus need a
more developed compliance function. 51 Compliance officers work in
all kinds of structures, depending upon the size and businesses of a
firm. 52 In large broker-dealers, compliance officers would generally
be in a separate department or division under the CCO and thus in a
separate reporting line. They might all be grouped in one central
location or work in the business groups or branch offices that they
advise and monitor. 53 In other words, like employees in other
control functions, such as internal auditors, compliance officers have
their own reporting structure, even if they work closely with business
groups when developing compliance procedures for business
activities. As a result of this distinction from business and of their
control function, the compensation for full-time compliance officers,
unlike that for most brokers and bankers, is not based on their
business productivity and only indirectly determined upon the
profitability of their branch or business line. 54
Heatmap, Table Broker-Dealer Creation and Termination By Year. For example, from 2008 to
July 2014, the number has declined from 4895 to 4137. See FINRA STATISTICS,
http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/Statistics/. The consolidation is due to numerous causes,
including the search for economies of scale, which has affected the entire financial industry,
and technological innovations, which allow investors to trade themselves without the aid of a
broker. See generally 1 NORMAN S. POSER & JAMES A. FANTO, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND
REGULATION 1-10 to 1-26, 1-39 to 1-43 (4th ed. 2007 & Supp. 2013) (discussing the
reasons for the industry’s transformation).
51. For a description of compliance at Goldman Sachs, see http://www.goldman
sachs.com/careers/why-goldman-sachs/our-divisions/global-compliance/index.html
(last
visited Jan. 8, 2014). Admittedly, many of those who have the position of compliance officer
or CCO in smaller firms have other jobs and do not devote themselves fulltime to compliance.
See NAT’L REGULATORY SERVS., COMPLIANCE COMPENSATION STUDY 5 (2011) (reporting
that even CCOs in major firms spend only half of their time on compliance).
52. See generally SIFMA, The Evolving Role of Compliance, supra note 49, at 17–18
(discussing the various compliance structures used).
53. See id. If they do so, they should not be under the authority of a branch manager or
of a principal in charge of a business line, but should be reporting to the CCO. See id. at 4.
54. See generally INST. FOR INT’L FIN. & OLIVER WYMAN, COMPENSATION REFORM IN
WHOLESALE BANKING 2011: ASSESSING THREE YEARS OF PROGRESS 11–12 (Oct. 2011)
(describing survey results of compensation practices in large financial firms for compliance and
other control functions). The author was on the working group assisting in the preparation of
this report. There is not extensive information available about compliance compensation. See
generally NAT’L REGULATORY SERV., supra note 51, at 5 (providing general survey data on
compliance compensation); SOCIETY OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS, 2012 CROSS
INDUSTRY CHIEF COMPLIANCE OFFICERS SALARY SURVEY 19 (2012) (indicating average
compensation for CCOs in financial services to be approximately $165,000); see also BUREAU
OF LABOR STATISTICS, OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS, OCCUPATIONAL
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As compliance has become a specialized role, it has taken on the
expected features of a professional undertaking, which reinforces its
specialization. 55 Traditionally, individuals learned compliance “on the
job.” Although this still occurs, there are now programs where a
compliance officer can obtain specialized training in compliance and
be “certified.” 56 Indeed, law schools are beginning to train students
for compliance positions as a result of their perception that
opportunities exist for students to become compliance officers in this
difficult employment environment. 57 There are, moreover,
compliance consultants often drawn from the ranks of former
regulators who train compliance officers who, in turn, provide onthe-job advice about how to best perform their work and who even
do certain compliance duties for a firm when they can be
outsourced. 58 Additionally, societies of compliance professionals
EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES MAY 2013, 13-1041 COMPLIANCE OFFICERS (reporting the mean
annual wage of compliance officers in other financial services as $90,800), available at
http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes131041.htm. Other data shows that it is less than
compensation for bankers and brokers, but that the gap has diminished as compensation for
compliance officers has increased. See INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL FINANCE & OLIVER
WYMAN, COMPENSATION REFORM IN WHOLESALE BANKING 2010: PROGRESS IN
IMPLEMENTING GLOBAL STANDARDS 22–23 (Sept. 2010) (discussing the narrowing gap
between compensation of business employees and those in control functions). Most recently, it
has stabilized, which means that, in the ongoing financial downturn, firms are demanding that
compliance officers do more tasks. See NAT’L REGULATORY SERVS., supra note 51, at 2 (noting
that compensation for compliance professionals has stagnated since 2008, despite new
regulatory demands).
55. There is a rich literature on the transformation of activities into “professions.” See,
e.g., MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
(1977).
56. One example is the annual FINRA Institute at Wharton, which trains and certifies
compliance professionals in the Certified Regulatory and Compliance Professional (“CRCP”)
Program. See Certified Regulatory and Compliance Professional Program, FINRA.ORG,
http://www.finra.org/Industry/Education/UniversityPrograms/FINRAInstitute (last visited
Sept. 22, 2014). The author of this Article has been a regular faculty member in this program,
teaching, among other things, the subjects of supervision and suitability. The National Society
of Compliance Professionals also operates a certification program, the Certified Securities
Compliance Professional Program. See Certified Securities Compliance Professional, CSCP.ORG,
http://www.cscp.org (last visited Sept. 22, 2014).
57. The Regulatory Compliance Association offers online education in asset
management compliance in conjunction with law schools. See Overview of Law & Masters
Concentration, https://www.rcaonline.org/law-masters-degree/law-students (last visited Sept.
22, 2014).
58. There are large numbers of these consultant groups. Representative of them are
Ascendant Compliance Management, ASCENDANT COMPLIANCE MANAGEMENT,
http://www.ascendantcompliance.com, (last visited Nov. 15, 2014), and Frontline
Compliance, LLC, FRONTLINE COMPLIANCE, http://www.frontlinecompliance.com, (last
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provide resources and discuss new issues and challenges. 59
Professional journals are also devoted to this activity. 60 Regulators
have encouraged this professionalization of compliance. 61 Therefore,
compliance officers can justly feel that the importance of their task
has been recognized by senior management in their firms and by
regulators, and that they have “arrived.”
B. The Basic Tasks of Compliance Officers
As discussed above, compliance is closely associated with, and
essentially makes possible, broker-dealer supervision because the
purpose of supervision is to ensure that a firm and its employees
comply with the federal securities laws and regulations, other
applicable laws, SRO rules, and industry standards. Compliance
officers perform this basic compliance function by providing advice
on a daily basis as to compliance requirements for individual business
activities. 62 To accomplish this task, compliance officers must have a
good understanding of WSPs and be familiar enough with business
employees’ activities to produce and update WSPs according to
FINRA mandates. 63 The WSPs dictate how employees should
conduct a particular business activity so as to comply with laws and
regulations and how the activity should be supervised and
monitored. The WSPs thus specify, in a step-by-step way, how a
broker conducts an activity, how recording or reporting relating to
the activity is done, how the designated supervisor oversees the
broker engaged in the activity, how additional monitoring occurs by
compliance staff, often through the review of transaction records,
how problems might emerge and what the broker, supervisor,

visited Nov. 15, 2014).
59. Again, the best-known in this respect is the National Society of Compliance
Professionals, http://www.nscp.org/site_home.cfm.
60. One example is Practical Compliance and Risk Management for the Securities Industry,
a journal that is published by Wolters Kluwer. The author is co–editor-in-chief of this journal.
61. For example, in conjunction with FINRA, the SEC holds compliance outreach
meetings where commissioners and staff meet with compliance officers and other control
professionals of broker-dealers. See 2014 Regional Compliance Outreach Program for BrokerDealers, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, available at http://www.sec.gov/info/complianceoutreachbd.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2014).
62. See SIFMA, White Paper, supra note 49, at 3. See also Vass, supra note 49, at 5
(referring to compliance, not pejoratively, as a “dumping ground”).
63. See SIFMA, White Paper, supra note 49, at 4.
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compliance officer, and/or another person should do in response to
those problems. 64
Producing, revising and implementing the WSPs are neverending tasks for compliance officers. Since the WSPs must cover
every securities activity in the firm in the extensive way suggested
above, and since firms often engage in new business lines and
produce and/or sell new products, compliance officers must
constantly create new WSPs. They must also refine existing WSPs in
response to problems or gaps revealed by the firm’s experience, by
the testing mandated by NASD Rule 3012, or as a result of issues in
WSPs raised by FINRA or regulators in an examination of a firm or
because of industry-wide matters. 65 Implementation means that a
64. Take, for example, a broker recommending an investment to a client, which raises,
among other things, “suitability” issues (i.e., the broker’s duty) when recommending an
investment or a strategy to a client to ensure that it is appropriate or “suitable” for the client.
See supra note 42. The WSPs would specify what the basic suitability obligation of a broker is
with reference to the law and to FINRA rules, explain how a broker satisfies this obligation
(i.e., learns about the product and gathers the appropriate information about the client to
determine whether the product is suitable for him or her), and direct the broker to record any
resulting transaction as a recommended transaction as well as the information reflecting that he
or she satisfied the suitability obligation. In addition, the WSPs should explain how a broker’s
supervisor reviews the transaction so as to ensure that the broker met his or her suitability
obligation. Moreover, the WSPs should set forth additional monitoring by compliance officers
and the procedures for brokers, supervisors, and compliance officers to follow if a client
complains about a transaction or if any other “red flag” about lack of appropriateness of the
product for the client appears. FINRA gives guidance on how a firm should design its
compliance procedures with respect to the suitability obligation. See FINRA, Suitability:
Guidance on FINRA’s Suitability Rule, REG. NOTICE NO. 12-55 4–5 (Dec. 2012) (making
recommendations as to supervision with respect to suitability when a broker recommends both
an investment product and a non-investment one); FINRA, Know Your Customer and
Suitability, supra note 42 (discussing a firm’s policies on documenting its compliance with the
suitability rule).
65. See SIA, WHITE PAPER ON THE ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 48, at 4.
Compliance might conduct the testing of the system together with the internal audit function,
which is designed to test a firm’s internal control procedures. See SIFMA, The Evolving Role of
Compliance, supra note 49, at 9. In a related context, compliance might also engage in some
aspects of a firm’s risk management, particularly by assessing its regulatory and reputational
risks. See id. at 20. To take a recent example again from the suitability context, the financial crisis
revealed many problems in the sale of structured products to retail customers, such as brokers’
lack of understanding about them and the unsuitable nature of them for many investors—which
are both suitability issues. Thus, compliance officers of broker-dealers that sold these products
had to revise the WSPs regarding the sale of such products to address these problems (e.g., by
enhancing the suitability analysis and supervisor oversight when they were sold). See generally
SEC, OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, STAFF SUMMARY REPORT ON
ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN EXAMINATIONS OF CERTAIN STRUCTURED SECURITIES PRODUCTS SOLD
TO RETAIL INVESTORS 7 (July 27, 2011) (discussing suitability issues in connection with the
selling of these products, which were revealed through SEC examinations).
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compliance officer ensures that employees are following the WSPs.
This task includes the distribution of the WSPs as well as any
supplementary documentation, such as required reports or forms
mandated by the WSPs, throughout the firm to its departments and
branches and the training of brokers and supervisors in the WSPs. 66
Compliance officers then check on whether in fact the procedures
are being followed, often through the production and review of
reports on transactions. 67 Today, compliance monitoring is aided by
technology, which has greatly automated the reporting and review
process. 68
Compliance officers identify and then follow up on compliance
problems or “red flags.” Compliance officers are thus responsible,
through their surveillance, for finding out that the WSPs are not
being followed, which may be due to anything from an innocent
mistake to fraud. 69 They often identify problems because, as noted
above, they review transaction records and communications and
through this review, they signal matters warranting further
66. See SIFMA, WHITE PAPER ON THE ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 48, at 4.
67. See id. at 4–5. This is often referred to as compliance’s “control,” as opposed to its
“advisory” function. See SIFMA, The Evolving Role of Compliance, supra note 49, at 4. The
classic compliance monitoring report is the “exception” report, which lists transactions that are
outside certain parameters specified by the WSPs or that are otherwise flagged as suspicious,
such as excessive trading or inappropriate concentration of certain products in accounts.
68. For an excellent discussion of problems inherent in the use of technology in
compliance, see Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in a
Digital Age, 88 TEX. L. REV. 669 (2010). Among these problems, Professor Bamberger
identifies values that may be embedded in the technology, but that may be at odds with
regulatory policies.
To stay with the suitability example, a compliance officer would check that a broker who
recommended a product to a customer, who then purchased it, had indeed gathered and
consulted the appropriate information about the customer (or reviewed the information on file
about him or her) in accordance with the WSPs, and that the broker had received appropriate
training in the product. See SIFMA, The Evolving Role of Compliance, supra note 49, at 24
(discussing monitoring required by the new suitability rule).
69. See SIFMA, WHITE PAPER ON THE ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 48, at 5;
SIFMA, The Evolving Role of Compliance, supra note 49, at 26 (discussing internal
investigations). Compliance officers may indicate, for example, that there are problems with a
newly opened account, such as a wrong address or missing information, which could be due to
an oversight of a broker or outright fraud. See, e.g., In re Citigroup Global Markets, Inc.,
FINRA Letter of Acceptance, Waiver and Consent No. 2008013231502 (Aug. 9, 2011),
available
at
http://www.finra.org/Industry/Enforcement/DisciplinaryActions/FDAS
(describing how a registered sales assistant in a branch office set up phony accounts and used
them to siphon off customer funds; the scheme was not discovered even though the
compliance department at the main office identified that the accounts often had phony
addresses and used names of persons who were deceased).
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investigation. Compliance officers also detect problems through the
routine internal inspections of offices and branches that are part of
the supervisory system. 70 In these inspections, officers check on
compliance with regulations by personnel in the office or branch. 71
Moreover, compliance officers are often the firm personnel who
assist FINRA, the SEC, and other regulators in regulatory
examinations of their firms and, as a result, they may discover
problems, or at least regulatory concerns, through their interaction
with the examiners. 72
This role of identifying potential violations of the federal
securities laws, FINRA, and firm rules raises the issue of the
responsibilities of the compliance officer within the firm and as part
of the regulatory system. As explained above, the compliance officer
is generally outside the supervisory structure of the firm. 73 If a
compliance officer detects a problem, he or she should alert the
supervisor who has authority over the broker or banker in question
so that the supervisor can take the appropriate disciplinary action or
report the problem up the chain of command in the firm, which
could involve a report to FINRA or the SEC. Yet, FINRA and SEC
officials often appear to expect compliance officers to be their “eyes
and ears” in the firm and to be responsible for reporting to them
potential legal and regulatory violations. 74 Compliance officers have
to walk a tightrope here, which means doing their job of
monitoring, following up on problems, and ensuring that
appropriate supervisors are notified and are taking action (often

70. See FINRA, supra note 40, at NASD Rule 3010(c). See also SIA, WHITE PAPER ON
ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 48, at 5; SIFMA, The Evolving Role of Compliance,
supra note 49, at 24–25.
71. Both the SEC and FINRA emphasize the importance of internal inspections,
particularly of branch offices. See SEC, OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS &
EXAMINATIONS, IN COOPERATION WITH FINRA, NATIONAL EXAMINATION RISK ALERT:
BROKER-DEALER BRANCH INSPECTIONS, Vol. I, Issue 2 (Nov. 30, 2011) (providing guidance
and best practices on how an internal inspection should be conducted).
72. See also SIFMA, WHITE PAPER ON THE ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 48, at 6;
SIFMA, The Evolving Role of Compliance, supra note 49, at 26. A broker-dealer is subject to
examination both by the SEC and FINRA, on a regular basis, as well as “for cause” (i.e., as a
result of a complaint) or because of an overall investigation into brokerage practices. For a
general discussion of this subject, see 1 POSER & FANTO, supra note 50, at 7-52 to 7-71.
73. See supra note 36.
74. See id.
THE
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action suggested by compliance), while not taking part in the
disciplinary and supervisory decisions. 75
Furthermore, compliance officers are educators within the
broker-dealer. Part of the supervisory obligation of broker-dealers
involves ensuring that the brokers meet their continuing education
obligation. 76 In addition, every broker must certify annually that he
or she is in compliance with applicable laws and regulations. 77
Compliance officers are generally responsible for this certification (or
for monitoring the technology permitting it), and they provide or
arrange for the provision of the necessary continuing education. 78
Because compliance officers monitor legal and regulatory
developments for WSP purposes, they are able to provide brokers
with legal and regulatory updates. They are also likely to be involved
in workforce training when new products or new business lines are
being introduced, thus requiring education for brokers about how to
sell the products or to do the new business in compliance with the
law. 79 Education has become a major task of compliance officers. In a
related vein, compliance officers promote the “culture” of
compliance in the firm by conducting training in professional and
ethical standards as well as by producing and administering a code of
ethical conduct for the firm. 80
In sum, the overall picture of a compliance officer that emerges
from the above review is that of a position that is intertwined with
75. See SIA, WHITE PAPER ON THE ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 48, at 10–13
(discussing the issue of the separation of compliance from supervision and recommending that
the distinction be maintained, unless specific circumstances suggest that a compliance officer
has actual authority over a matter).
76. For a discussion of the continuing education obligations of broker-dealers and their
registered representatives, see generally 1 POSER & FANTO, supra note 50, at 6-56.10 to 656.12. These requirements are set out in FINRA Rule 1250. Generally, a broker must fulfill a
continuing education requirement every three years.
77. See supra note 40, at NASD Rule 3010(a)(7).
78. See SIA, WHITE PAPER ON THE ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 48, at 4.
79. See id. at 7.
80. See id.; SIFMA, The Evolving Role of Compliance, supra note 49, at 27–28. In
addition, compliance officers have many specialized functions as well: among other things, they
oversee the screening process and background checks for employees as well as their licensing
and qualifications; they establish and oversee anti-money laundering and Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act programs; they establish control programs for the safeguarding of customer
nonpublic personal information; and they oversee procedures designed to prevent insider
trading and other conflicts of interest. See generally SIA, WHITE PAPER ON THE ROLE OF
COMPLIANCE, supra note 48, at 5–6; SIFMA, The Evolving Role of Compliance, supra note 49,
at 24–26. These functions are too numerous to discuss here.
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every securities business of the firm and with each employee. As a
central task, compliance officers must establish, test, and revise WSPs
as well as educate brokers concerning them, monitor compliance
with them, and identify and report on WSP problems. The role of
compliance has grown in broker-dealers as the number of WSPs has
expanded. Yet compliance officers do so much more, from advising
on compliance involving daily business matters and educating
brokers to maintaining regular contact with regulators. Compliance
is now well established in broker-dealers and the status of compliance
officers in both firms and among regulators is growing. However,
this positive picture obscures several fundamental problems with the
current orientation of compliance, so it is appropriate to turn a
critical eye to it.
II. THE PROBLEM WITH THE CURRENT ORIENTATION OF
COMPLIANCE
A. The Origin, Purpose, and Consequences of External Compliance
In one of his most well-known books, Discipline and Punish, the
French historian and philosopher Michel Foucault used the model of
the prison as a symbol for the new kind of punishment that emerged
out of the Enlightenment. 81 He employed the vivid image of the
“panopticon,” which was a prison construction, often with prison
cells arranged in a circle around a central monitoring tower, where
each prisoner could be viewed at all times. 82
Foucault discussed how reformers of this period believed that
prisoners could be controlled and, in some cases, rehabilitated
through a discipline that contrasted with the brutal medieval
punishment that was used to display publicly the power of the
sovereign. Foucault showed how this new discipline was applied to
the minute details of conduct so as to dictate every movement of the
prisoner and how he or she would be watched to ensure conformity
with the discipline. This process was designed to transform both the
body and even the mind of the prisoner so that he or she would be
literally “re-formed” to become a productive person who could
return to society. 83
81. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, SURVEILLER ET PUNIR: NAISSANCE DE LA PRISON 80
(1975).
82. See id. at 201–13.
83. See id. at 126–32.
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Foucault explained that, through his discussion of the discipline
in the prison, he was identifying a kind of social control or power
that was based upon the Enlightenment’s faith in reason’s ability to
remake individuals and society: this was the “soft” power of physical
and mental control that reformers, in the exercise of their reason
with social goals, would exert over those in need of direction. 84 As
he explained, the use of this power migrated out of the prison into
other social activities when its proponents realized its value. 85
Foucault highlighted the example of the assembly line and other
“mechanized labor” in a factory, where managerial scientists
calculated and shaped the motions of employees to make them as
productive as possible. 86 The use of the new discipline also
transformed education when educational reformers employed it to
train and to form children and young adults, both physically and
mentally, for the labor that was needed in society. 87
With the risk of making a too vivid analogy, broker-dealer
compliance appears to be an activity that reflects Foucault’s analysis
of the new form of disciplinary control. This is, in fact, not
surprising, since in his view the new techniques of control were
employed in major productive social activities. Typical brokers, like
Foucault’s prisoners, are the “subjects” of the supervisory system
and thus of compliance, and have their actions and words dictated by
compliance procedures and monitored by compliance officers. As
noted above, WSPs specify how brokers must conduct themselves,
and even what they should say, with respect to a given securities
activity. 88 Their actions and communications are both recorded and
reviewed, sometimes in real time, by their immediate supervisors and
also by compliance officers. From Foucault’s perspective, therefore,
compliance procedures “form” brokers by controlling their conduct
and by subjecting them to scrutiny—in sum, brokers are surrounded
by a web of control and surveillance. As broker-dealers have come to
use technology in this monitoring, moreover, the scrutiny to which
brokers are subject has become real-time.
This use of Foucault’s insight concerning soft power in the
broker-dealer context is not intended to ignore the obvious. The
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See id. at 133–34.
See id. at 139–40.
See, e.g., id. at 146–47.
See, e.g., id. at 148–49.
See supra text accompanying notes 63–64.
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current all-encompassing discipline and monitoring of broker-dealer
employees by compliance officers owe much to the enhanced
oversight of employee activities that has always typified financial
firms. Since brokers, like bankers, insurance brokers, and commodity
firm employees deal with cash and personal property that can be
easily stolen or misused, they are subject to particular scrutiny. 89
Moreover, as is well known, retail investments are subject to
heightened protection under the federal securities laws since our
economic system would be greatly harmed if investors had no
confidence that their assets would be safe in the hands of financial
firms, such as broker-dealers. 90 Investors would simply refuse to
invest, which would result in funds not ending up in the hands of
entrepreneurs and their new and higher-valued enterprises.
Therefore, it is not surprising that employees in broker-dealers are
subject, through SEC and FINRA regulation, to a detailed legal and
regulatory, and thus a compliance, framework. 91 In addition, as the
financial sector has developed over time and as the regulation of it
has grown, particularly in response to scandals, this framework and
its accompanying compliance obligations have grown more complex.
Moreover, as Foucault himself emphasized, a main purpose of the
“new” disciplinary power is efficient production in whatever domain
it is applied to. Thus, the WSPs are designed to make brokers more
efficient and productive within the boundaries of law and regulation.
Finally, Foucault’s account of the transformation of modern
production is, of course, one among many (albeit a vivid one), with
other scholars and historians calling attention to hierarchical
techniques and other features of production that came into
widespread existence with industrialization in the modern era. 92
89. For example, many early cases on the fiduciary duties of directors involve the failure
of bank directors to supervise employees who steal money from customers. See, e.g., Litwin v.
Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 677–79 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940).
90. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION 2–3 (12th
ed. 2012) (discussing basic consumer protection rationale for securities regulation).
91. From the Foucault perspective, this important social activity, public investment, is
exactly where the disciplinary power would be used.
92. See, e.g., DAVID S. LANDES, THE WEALTH AND POVERTY OF NATIONS: WHY SOME
ARE SO RICH AND SOME SO POOR 204–10 (1998) (discussing the transformation of labor
relations spurred on by technological changes); ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE
HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 415–54 (1977) (discussing
the transformation in management and its elaborate hierarchies of oversight and control that
made the large business firm possible). Moreover, there has been work discussing how
workplace “culture” has been used as a way both to motivate and to control employees in
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Foucault suggested, however, that this all-pervasive discipline
and surveillance were unlikely ever to be fully achieved in any given
domain, even in prison. First, these techniques of control could not
hope to capture all the complex conduct and attitudes of human
beings; this made the panopticon an unattainable ideal. Second,
individuals resisted the techniques imposed upon them. 93 Social
psychologists and organizational scholars offer related criticisms
about the effectiveness of this “top-down,” panoptical approach.
They acknowledge that surveillance is effective and indeed necessary:
psychological studies show that individuals pay particular attention
to rules and generally do not misbehave when someone is watching
them. 94 However, they argue that this approach is difficult to put
into practice in a way that it would successfully monitor all employee
conduct at all times. They also suggest that such extensive oversight
is not the most effective method of producing legally and ethically
compliant conduct among firm employees, and may even have the
unintended opposite result. 95
This counterproductive result could occur in the following way.
Except on routine matters, the performance of financial activities in
broker-dealers, such as providing investment recommendations,
demands the exercise of considerable discretion and expertise by the
broker. Indeed, the use of this discretion is what makes him or her a
valued and productive employee. Admittedly, all employees in a
broker-dealer today understand that they are in a highly regulated
industry where compliance is a fact of life. Nonetheless, the
compliance system embodied by the WSPs could well appear to them
to be something external, and not reflective of their own selfidentities and self-definitions, which are centered on their productive
securities activities and the business groups where they conduct these
activities. 96 After all, broker-dealers are profit-making firms in the
knowledge-based fields, like computer engineering. See, e.g., GIDEON KUNDA, ENGINEERING
CULTURE (rev. ed. 2006).
93. See FOUCAULT, supra note 81, at 35, 315 (suggesting the resistance to the allencompassing disciplinary power).
94. See Weaver & Treviño, supra note 5, at 329–30.
95. See id. at 323 (stating the drawbacks of a rules- or compliance-oriented approach, as
opposed to one linked with values).
96. See id. at 323. This remark reflects a view that individuals have multiple “selves” or
identities, which they adopt when they work in groups that they identify with. A productive
broker would generally adopt the identity offered by his or her group of other brokers and
securities personnel, at least while working within the securities business. See generally S.
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highly competitive, profit-focused financial industry. That
compliance, with its monitoring, reporting, recordings, reviews,
inquiries, and inspections is the domain of non-productive, nonbusiness personnel and is costly97 inevitably reinforces in the
employees’ minds the distinction between the securities business and
the compliance function as well as the distinction between those who
work in both sectors. Additionally, brokers know that compliance
officers report problems to their supervisors and to senior
management and understand that compliance officers are the “eyes
and ears” of the SEC and FINRA. From the broker’s perspective,
this reporting mission of compliance officers further separates
brokers from them, especially since internal disciplinary, regulatory,
or FINRA actions can threaten a broker’s livelihood. 98
Since, therefore, brokers will view compliance as external to their
central business identity, even while they recognize that it is part of
their job, there is equally a risk that they will deal with the WSPs and
compliance policies in a routine, “check-the-box” way. In the worst
case, they might even feel justified in evading or gaming compliance
restrictions or trying to persuade compliance officials to ignore their
transgressions, especially when the brokers are acting in accordance
with their self-identity, which is formed by the attitudes of their
business group and peers. 99 Since the WSPs embody the policies of
ALEXANDER HASLAM, PSYCHOLOGY IN ORGANIZATIONS: THE SOCIAL IDENTITY APPROACH
30 (2d ed. 2004) (“[A]s a group member the self is defined stereotypically in terms of
attributes (such as values and goals) that are shared with others who are perceived to be
representative of the same social category.”). Anecdotally, this appears to reflect accounts of
working in the securities industry, even for those who thought that they would never fit into
its culture. See, e.g., JONATHAN A. KNEE, THE ACCIDENTAL INVESTMENT BANKER: INSIDE
THE DECADE THAT TRANSFORMED WALL STREET (2006).
97. See generally SECURITIES INDUSTRY ASS’N, THE COSTS OF COMPLIANCE IN THE
U.S. SECURITIES INDUSTRY: SURVEY REPORT 5 (2006) (finding, based on a survey,
compliance costs averaging 13% of net revenue (revenue less interest expenses) per firm).
98. A broker can be disciplined by his or her firm. If a firm has knowledge that, among
other things, a broker has been involved in a securities violation or other regulatory violation,
it is obligated to report this to FINRA. See FINRA Rule 4530. A broker is likely to be
disciplined by FINRA for minor or serious violations, since FINRA acts as a first line of defense
with respect to broker-dealers. The SEC may also bring an enforcement action against a
broker. The disciplinary action from either FINRA or SEC enforcement proceedings ranges
from fines to suspensions, and from practice to industry bars. See generally POSER & FANTO,
supra note 50, at 14-1 to 14-60.
99. FINRA and SEC disciplinary actions bear witness that this kind of cooptation occurs
when brokers enlist compliance officers in their wrongdoing. See, e.g., Melhado, Flynn &
Associates, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 64468, 101 SEC DOCKET 181 (May 11, 2011)
(recounting a settlement involving a compliance director who assisted the scheme of the CEO
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the federal securities laws and regulations, as well as FINRA
professional and ethical standards, brokers’ alienation from them
means that the law, regulation, and standards, as well as their
policies, become separated from brokers’ main activities and, indeed,
their identity. In the parlance of social psychology and organizational
studies, the law and policies “fade” when brokers and other
employees involved in the securities business make important
decisions or take other actions. 100 This fading can in fact produce
exactly the opposite of compliant conduct, for a broker’s decision
making and behavior are then based primarily upon other
motivations such as the self-interest and group interest that define
the individual’s self-identity as a securities professional. 101 In addition
and more subtly, by following the letter of the WSP routines, brokers

of a broker-dealer and of an investment adviser who “cherry picked” trades so as to allocate
profitable ones to the firm’s proprietary account and later to favored hedge fund clients at the
expense of other advisory clients). In an absolutely worst case, where they think that they can
do it without detection or with impunity, brokers simply ignore the WSPs and compliance
altogether. See Tammy L. MacLean & Michael Behnam, The Dangers of Decoupling: The
Relationship between Compliance Programs, Legitimacy Perceptions, and Institutionalized
Misconduct, 53 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1499 (2010) (presenting evidence from a broker-dealer firm
that when a firm uses compliance as “window dressing” and divorces it from business practices,
employees are prone to dismiss it and engage in more misconduct, which becomes
institutionalized).
100. See BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 8, at 69–70; Tenbrunsel & SmithCrowe, supra note 8, at 561 (discussing the phenomenon of fading).
101. That is, if legal and regulatory policies and professional and ethical standards do not
come to the forefront in decision making, then other goals, needs, and desires motivate
thought and conduct. Given that self-interest is explicitly championed as the norm
determining conduct in the financial industry, which norm would include the group interest of
a collection of brokers in a business division or team all working for their collective selfinterest, it is likely that self-interest will be the primary motivation for brokers. For a personal
account of the loss of the client focus in favor of the self-interest of bankers, see KNEE, supra
note 96, at 222–30. Psychologists explain that, if the rational, reflective self (often referred to
as “system 2”) is not motivated to consider a particular subject, the automatic or instinctual
self (referred to as “system 1”) reacts, and this system is oriented to self-interest. See generally
DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 20–29 (2011) (discussing the two selves in
general); JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY
POLITICS AND RELIGION 54–55 (2012) (discussing the metaphor of the automatic, emotional
“elephant,” which is oriented towards the self, and the rational, but secondary, “rider”); Yuval
Feldman, Behavioral Ethics Meets Behavioral Law and Economics, 8 (2013 draft) (discussing
“the automaticity of self-interest”). Groups and even organizations can embrace the “self”
orientation as their norm or as part of their organizational culture. See generally Albert
Bandura, Social Cognitive Theory: An Agentic Perspective, 52 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 1, 15
(2001) (“Social structures are created by human activity, and sociostructural practices, in turn,
impose constraints and provide enabling resources and opportunity structures for personal
development and functioning.”).
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may feel that they have satisfied their legal and professional
obligations, which satisfaction liberates them to act even more
opportunistically, and possibly unethically, in their business dealings. 102
The SEC and FINRA, and even the leaders of the brokerage
industry, recognize that the compliance model of all-encompassing
WSPs and the resulting surveillance are inadequate for effective
compliance, although they do not appear to perceive the negative
effects of external compliance. They exhort firms and brokers to
espouse a “culture of compliance,” which, as discussed below, should
properly refer to a different kind of compliance approach—one that
will be characterized as an internal, rather than an external, model of
compliance. 103 After all, a basic FINRA professional standard is
echoed in Rule 2010, which refers to conducting business with
“high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable
principles of trade.” 104 Yet, despite the references to the culture of
compliance, the panopticon approach remains the main one and
continues to grow as there is a constant demand for new WSPs in
response to new law and regulation and to SEC and FINRA
enforcement and pronouncements. Thus, the dominant approach
effectively drowns out the regulatory exhortations for a culture of
compliance.
B. The Reinforcement of the Current Compliance Orientation
The 2007–2008 financial crisis was, among other things, the
result of a failure of compliance in broker-dealers. 105 Legal,
regulatory, and ethical policies were pushed into the background, or
102. See Daylian M. Cain et al., The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing
Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1(2005) (discussing, among other things, the
“liberating” effects of disclosure).
103. See, e.g., SIFMA, The Evolving Role of Compliance, supra note 49, at 27 (citing calls
for a “culture of compliance” by various SEC officials).
104. See FINRA Rule 2010.
105. Now, several years after the onset of the crisis, there have been countless studies
about the crisis and continuing analysis about its causes. See, e.g., THE PANIC OF 2008, supra
note 12 (collection of essays on the topic); RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY, supra note 13
(same). Some blame the crisis on the flow of easy capital into the United States during the precrisis years, while others focus on the political policies that encouraged home loans to lowincome borrowers who had no means of repaying them. See THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
REPORT, supra note 11, at xxv–xxvii (summarizing the debate and providing its own views).
The only general agreement is that numerous parties, from politicians, bankers, regulators,
investors and compliance officers, contributed to the crisis. See id. at xviii–xxiii (surveying
responsible parties).
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faded, in broker decision making while other human motivations,
chiefly self-interest, crowded them out. 106 To take one prominent
example, broker-dealers were heavily involved in the securitization of
subprime loans and the sale of the resulting mortgage-backed
securities. 107 They also created the variations of these securities,
including the collateralized debt obligations, which were securities
on pools of other mortgage-backed securities, and the synthetic
instruments that mirrored their performance. 108 As is now well
known, the firms also made markets on these various instruments
and designed specialized investments in them for sophisticated
parties. 109 A sponsor of a securitized pool had the legal obligation to
ensure that the assets, i.e., the mortgages or asset-backed securities,
were properly valued. 110 Broker-dealers marketing the securities had
an obligation to provide adequate disclosure of the risks associated
with those securities. 111 However, in many cases, firms did not
properly value the assets or adequately disclose those risks. 112
Moreover, brokers were supposed to understand the products
because without this understanding, they could not legally sell them

106. Social psychologists have written about a “calculative mindset,” which, when
activated in a given context, leads individuals to focus on their self-interest at the expense of
the effects of their conduct on others and on the ethics of their conduct. See Long Wang & J.
Keith Murnighan, On Greed, 5 ACAD. MGMT. ANNALS 279, 295, 301 (2011). This mindset is
more in the nature of an emotionally charged, self-oriented focus, and the mental effort
associated with it would be less complex than moral reasoning. See id. at 298, 301. See also
Long Wang et al., The Ethical and Social Consequences of a Calculative Mindset, 125 ORG’L
BEHAV & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 39, 43 (2014) (reciting results of experiments showing
that triggering a calculative mindset produces more self-interested conduct at the expense of
social and ethical values).
107. See THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 11, at 68–72.
108. See id. at 127–34.
109. These were derivatives based upon the mortgage-backed securities or their offspring.
See id. at 50–51 (discussing basic credit-default swap). The involvement of investment banks in
designing products, which banks both sold to investors and took an opposing position on,
came particularly to light in the hearing on Goldman Sachs before the Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations, held on April 26–27, 2010. See SEN. PERMANENT
SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A
FINANCIAL COLLAPSE 376–635 (Apr. 13, 2011) (detailing Goldman’s conflicts of interest in
designing derivative securities). A low-level Goldman officer, Fabrice Tourre, involved in one
such product was found to have violated the securities laws. See Justin Baer et al., “Fab” Trader
Liable in Fraud, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2013 (online edition).
110. See THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 11, at xxii.
111. See SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 109, at 322–
24 (summarizing these obligations).
112. See id. at 318–20 (summarizing these and other failings).

1155

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

5/22/2015 5:28 PM

2014

to any customer. 113 Again, brokers often had little understanding of
what they were selling and, in the worst cases, they sold products
simply to offload them from a broker-dealer’s books. 114 At times,
these activities involved a direct violation of securities laws or
regulations, or SRO rules. At other times, they fell into the grey area
of running counter to professional or ethical standards. 115 Since
compliance’s mission was to ensure that all these activities were done
in accordance with the law, regulations, and professional standards,
these illegalities and other problems represent a wholesale
compliance failure.
Despite this failure, the existing external compliance model has
since been reinforced and extended. The maintenance of the
compliance status quo is not surprising because in the immediate
response to the financial crisis, legislators, regulators, SROs, and
financial firms followed the understandable strategy of trying to fill
evident gaps in regulation and self-regulation of the financial sector
that the crisis had exposed. 116 For example, the issuance of assetbacked securities and the conduct of the investment banks involved
in this process are now regulated in more detail. Banks are required
to avoid conflicts of interest in the sales of these securities and to
enhance disclosure of any conflicts. 117 All of this lawmaking, with its
accompanying growth in SEC regulations and FINRA rules, resulted
113. See supra note 42 (summarizing suitability obligations).
114. See, e.g., Cody, Exchange Act Release No. 64565 (2011) (recounting facts of
FINRA disciplinary action, upheld by the SEC, where a broker sold mortgage-backed
securities to retail customers with practically no understanding of the products).
115. This would include, for example, taking advantage of a client while not literally
violating a regulation. See, e.g., SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra
note 109, at 425–30 (discussing Goldman Sachs’s manipulation of prices of collateralized debt
swaps that adversely affected counterparties).
116. The major response is obviously Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1375, a detailed summary of which is beyond the scope of this Article. A glance through some
of its titles, however, shows that it was clearly designed to fill in gaps, or at least perceived gaps,
in the regulation: Title II (instituting an “orderly liquidation authority” for large financial
firms); Title VII (among other things, bringing within regulation swaps); Title IX (among
other things, improving the process of the sale of asset-backed securities); and Title XIV
(reform of mortgage origination). It is natural that, in a first response to a crisis, individuals
will use methods or tools with which they are familiar and that they have employed in the past.
Cf. Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW
AND ECONOMICS 48–49 (Cass R. Sunstein ed. 2000) (observing that government officials
could fall victim equally to behavioral biases).
117. This is in Subtitle D of Title IX of Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1890–98. The SEC promulgated rules relating to the issuance of asset-backed securities. See
Regulation AB, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.1100–1123 (2013).
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in more work for compliance officers because they have to translate
the rules and regulations into WSPs with accompanying monitoring,
reporting, and inspections. 118 Dodd-Frank and the SEC also used
the existing model of compliance as it brought previously
unregulated financial participants under regulation. For instance, a
significant part of that legislation involved the regulation of the swap
markets and their major participants. 119 Swap dealers are now
regulated in a manner that, understandably enough, parallels, and is
modeled on, that of broker-dealers. 120 As a result of these
regulations, a swap dealer must have a supervisory and recordkeeping structure, which naturally demands a compliance
function. 121
In addition, regulators and SROs enhanced their oversight of
financial firms and their enforcement after the recent financial crisis,
which increased the workload of compliance officers. This increased
oversight comes in response to criticism that the regulators
themselves failed to detect and to punish the abuses that were at the
origin of the financial crisis. 122 Both the SEC and FINRA revamped
their examinations of broker-dealers with, among other things, the
involvement of more specialist examiners, the sharing of information
among their divisions (including the enforcement division), and
more examinations targeted at firms presenting the highest risk. 123
118. Compliance officers, like anybody else, have finite time and resources. The more
time they need to write new WSPs, the less time they have for other activities. See Vass, supra
note 49, at 10.
119. This is in Title VII of Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1658-1802.
Swap regulation was divided between the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the
SEC, depending upon the nature of the underlying asset that was the subject of the swap.
120. See POSER & FANTO, supra note 50, at 5-40 to 5-44.
121. Indeed, the new section 15F(k) of the Exchange Act dealing with security-based
swap dealer regulation mandates that such a dealer have a Chief Compliance Officer to
implement the compliance function in the dealer. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o–78k.
122. See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 11, at xviii (faulting financial
regulators with not having prevented the crisis).
123. The requirement to enhance examinations came indirectly out of the financial crisis,
for it was motivated by the SEC’s failure to detect the Bernard Madoff scandal, which was
revealed when his Ponzi scheme collapsed during the crisis. See SEC OFFICE OF
INVESTIGATIONS, INVESTIGATION OF FAILURE OF THE SEC TO UNCOVER BERNARD
MADOFF’S PONZI SCHEME—PUBLIC VERSION (Rep. No. OIG-509, Aug. 31, 2009). The
SEC’s enhancement of examinations was mandated by Congress in Dodd-Frank section 929U,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1867, which, among other things, added a new Section 4(h)
to the Exchange Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d(h) (2012). This provision required specialized
examiners for the SEC’s Division of Trading and Markets, which oversees broker-dealers. Id.
On the SEC’s risk-based examination system, see U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR
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The SEC formed prosecutorial groups that target particular kinds of
financial institutions and specific abuses. 124 All of this examination
and enforcement activity demands the attention of compliance
officers, who generally function as the “point person” for the firm in
regulatory examinations and assist legal officers in responding to
enforcement inquiries. 125 Moreover, the aggressive attitude of the
SEC and FINRA examiners and enforcement personnel reinforces
the link between compliance officers and regulators, which, as noted
above, further separates compliance officers from the securities
business in the eyes of brokers. 126
This reaffirmation and extension of the external model of
compliance are a lost opportunity to think critically about the
current orientation of compliance and may have adverse
consequences for finance and the economy. The financial crisis
revealed the dangers emanating from large financial conglomerates
involved in, among other things, capital market activities, particularly
the economic downturn and political instability that flow from the
collapse or near collapse of these institutions. 127 Compliance, of
2012 AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT 3 (2013). On FINRA’s enhancement to its own
examinations in reaction to the scandal, see SPECIAL REVIEW COMM., REPORT OF THE 2009
SPECIAL REVIEW COMMITTEE ON FINRA’S EXAMINATION PROGRAM IN LIGHT OF THE
STANFORD AND MADOFF SCHEMES 6–8 (Sept. 2009).
124. See, e.g., Robert S. Khuzami, Director of SEC Div. of Enforcement, Speech (Jan. 13,
2010) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch011310rsk.htm)
(introducing the directors of the five new National Specialized Units: Asset Management,
Market Abuse, Structured and New Products, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and Municipal
Securities and Public Pension).
125. See supra text accompanying note 72.
126. Indeed, the SEC’s recently adopted whistleblower rules, which allow a
whistleblower to bypass internal reporting to report firm problems directly to regulators,
particularly puts pressure on compliance officers to pass along to supervisors potential firm
issues before a regulator learns about them from a whistleblower. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.21F-1
to .21F-17. This regulation was promulgated pursuant to Section 922 of Dodd-Frank, codified
at 21F of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6.
127. Serious economic downturns generally follow the collapse of a financial system. See
CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT
CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 3–20 (2009). The financial sector has become large and
concentrated in the United States, see JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 10, at 189–222, prone to
boom and bust cycles, see HYMAN P. MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY 219–45
(1986) (explaining how financial firms lead to “boom and bust” cycles through their financing
activities, which he calls “Ponzi” finance), and with the tendency to internalize its profits and
to externalize its losses on others, chiefly U.S. taxpayers. The ownership structure of financial
firms, which are in corporate, not partnership form, and where employees have no long-term
connection to them, contributes to this characteristic of firm employees capturing the profits,
but not taking the losses, since they have often left firms before the adverse outcomes of their
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course, cannot change financial firms in general and broker-dealers in
particular, but it could play a critical role in reducing the instability
and other externalities arising from financial firms. This may be
because no other party can fulfill compliance’s particular role. After a
crisis, legislators, regulators, and SROs often show a renewed zeal for
law creation and enforcement, but their efforts eventually wane.
Legislators become distracted by other, more immediate concerns.
Regulators, like the SEC, have limited resources in this time of
scarcity and their budgets are not growing and are unlikely to
grow. 128 Despite reforms, regulators cannot realistically be counted
on to identify significant problems in broker-dealers ahead of time,
for they always remain outside the firms. FINRA can improve, and
has improved, its oversight over broker-dealers, but, while it is closer
to these firms, its examiners and enforcement staff do not work in
the firms on a day-to-day basis. 129
Compliance officers, by contrast, are omnipresent in the brokerdealers and are specifically charged with legal, professional, and
ethical compliance. Most importantly, they actually see what is
occurring in the firms. These compliance officers are thus particularly
well situated to alert supervisors and senior executives to growing
problems, such as the subprime loans and their securitization, that
may eventually infiltrate the financial industry and gradually grow
into a systemic problem. 130 Because compliance officers are involved
activities appear. See generally Gian Luca Clementi et al., Rethinking Compensation in
Financial Firms, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY, supra note 13, at 197–214. The
financial firms could contribute to political instability because they helped create a growing
wealth disparity in this country and because they are perceived as being aligned with the
political elite. See supra note 14. See also RAGHURAM G. RAJAN, FAULT LINES: HOW HIDDEN
FRACTURES STILL THREATEN THE WORLD ECONOMY 183–201 (2010) (discussing ways to
address inequality in the United States). They influence all political parties. See, e.g., CHARLES
GASPARINO, BOUGHT AND PAID FOR: THE UNHOLY ALLIANCE BETWEEN BARACK OBAMA
AND WALL STREET ix–xi (2010) (listing campaign donations from major financial firms and
individuals for 2007–2010).
128. For a description of the SEC’s lack of adequate financial resources for its mission in
recent years, see U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STRATEGIC PLAN: FISCAL YEARS 2010–2015, at
6–7 (2010).
129. See FINRA, Compliance Exams, available at http://www.finra.org/Industry/
Compliance/ComplianceExams/ (discussing FINRA’s routine compliance examinations).
130. The notion of this kind of problem or risk as a “virus” is useful here. This term
comes from KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS
CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS (2011). Systemic problems often start small
in a marginal firm or outside the center of activities in a major firm, which means that they are
invisible to regulators, SROs, and even senior executives in the firms. The problem then
gradually infiltrates other firms and activities.
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with compliance and assisting in the supervision of every broker and
securities activity in a broker-dealer, they are perfectly positioned to
identify problems before the problems transform into larger,
potentially systemic issues.
Furthermore, given the sheer number of new laws and
regulations imposed upon broker-dealers as a result of the most
recent financial crisis, it is doubtful whether the industry could
survive the regulatory response to another major crisis in its present
form. That is, the laws, regulations, and standards affecting brokerdealers have become so numerous that it takes considerable time,
effort, and cost for a firm, even with the help of compliance officers,
to ensure that they are followed. These regulatory requirements lead
to the elimination of smaller broker-dealers that cannot afford the
regulatory burdens and inhibit firms from entering into new
activities. The vibrancy, flexibility, and competitiveness of the
financial industry are thus adversely affected. Highly visible, wellfunctioning compliance officers, who help firm employees make
decisions animated by legal policies and professional and ethical
standards, could help prevent the recurrence of this cycle of crisis
and regulation. Their activity could convince legislators, regulators,
and, most important of all, the public that financial firms are
dedicated to the valuable social mission that finance fulfills and are
not simply in business for their own self-interest and are thus not in
need of still more detailed rules of conduct. However, for
compliance to help firms stay true to their social purpose, reduce
their risks, and thus remain viable requires that its current external
orientation be supplemented.
III. THE REFORM OF COMPLIANCE
A. A Reorientation from the External to Internal Approach
This Part argues that compliance in broker-dealers must reorient
its approach from the current external disciplinary model discussed
above to an internal perspective. This does not mean that it must
abandon its role of producer, monitor, and enforcer of the WSPs. As
explained earlier, the external approach is necessary to prevent and
detect major legal and ethical violations and is mandated by law and
regulation. 131 Yet compliance cannot rely only upon this approach,
131. Psychologists explain the importance and effectiveness of external oversight on
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which results in an ever increasing number of WSPs with the
compliance burden that this entails, which produces the resistance,
gaming, or routine-following by brokers and which exacerbates the
distinction between compliance and the securities business.
Moreover, the goal of the panopticon—to watch everyone at all
times—is unachievable. 132 Rather, compliance must develop and
promote another existing approach: internal compliance.
The basic purpose of internal compliance is what the term
implies: to have brokers comply because of internal motivations
rather than only because of pressures from external rules and from
monitoring by compliance officers. 133 Naturally, brokers
“internalize” the laws, regulations, and professional standards in
their minds and generally organize their conduct in accordance with
them, for one goal of the external approach is to produce this
internal effect. 134 Moreover, the laws, rules, and standards are
intertwined with how the securities business is conducted today.
However, the internal compliance espoused here is of a different
order from this mental acceptance of the constraints of law and
regulation. Under it, brokers would use the goals and policies of
securities regulation and FINRA professional standards in their
decision making and thus in orienting their conduct. Psychologists
tell us that a person’s beliefs and actions will best reflect such goals,
policies, and standards if the person—a broker in this case—
understands them as being implicated in his or her everyday work
decisions and conduct. 135 That is, the goals, policies, and standards
come to mind in decision making because they are part of brokers’
self-identity, and thus they contend with, and even suppress, other
motivations such as the self-interest that may characterize brokers’
business identity and that of their business group. 136 This internal
compliance. See supra note 94.
132. Of course, with advances in technology, it is conceivable that nearly every word and
action of a broker could be captured in some way and thus monitored in real time. But this
kind of monitoring will still be costly and one suspects that human ingenuity can find a way to
game it.
133. See Weaver & Treviño, supra note 5, at 320 (noting how a values-based compliance
orientation is part of an employee’s identity).
134. See id. at 323 (discussing how an external compliance orientation affects an
employee’s internal calculations about how to conduct himself or herself).
135. See id. at 320–21 (discussing a values-based orientation, as opposed to a compliance
one, which motivates employees by appealing to the congruence of the organizational values
and those of employees).
136. See BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 8, at 153–54 (discussing the power of
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approach is particularly important for compliance in knowledgeintensive tasks like brokerage, where, to be productive, an employee
must be given considerable discretion in how to perform the job at
hand. Again, the external approach monitors, to the extent it can,
the exercise of discretion while the internal approach will use
discretion to foster compliance.
Once again, to use an example from suitability, in recommending
securities or strategies to a customer, a broker is mandated to find
those “suitable” to the customer in light of his or her investment
holdings and goals, time horizon for investing, liquidity needs, risk
tolerance, etc. 137 In making the recommendation, the broker has
considerable discretion among the possible products and strategies.
It is certainly conceivable that a “suitable” product might favor the
broker or his or her firm in some way, such as by an enhanced
commission or because of its sponsorship by an affiliated firm. 138 A
supervisor’s review and compliance monitoring (or customer
complaints) will likely identify only clear suitability violations and will
thus have little effect upon the broker’s discretion. By contrast,
internal compliance would be designed to promote customer service
and benefit as the animating goals, policies, or standards for the
broker’s decision making in this context. With such an orientation,
the broker would be inclined to use discretion in the client’s favor,
i.e., in this case, to recommend a suitable, but low-cost product. An
even broader principle applicable in these circumstances would be
fostering customer trust, and therefore involvement, in the financial
industry and the securities markets, which ultimately allows for an
efficient use of capital in society. The purpose of internal compliance
is, therefore, to have the brokers, on their own, live up to FINRA’s

the “want” self). In psychological terms, these other motivations, particularly those centering
on the self, are often “implicit” or automatic, and thus powerful. See generally John A. Bargh
& Tanya L. Chartrand, The Unbearable Automaticity of Being, 54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 462,
468–69 (1999).
137. See supra notes 42, 64 and accompanying text.
138. Under the suitability rule, a broker does not have to recommend a product that is
the lowest in terms of commissions and fees; he or she must recommend one that, on the basis
of all the factors involved, is suitable to the client. A broker would violate the suitability
obligation, however, if, all things being equal, he or she recommended a product specifically to
maximize his or her own profit. See FINRA, REG. NOTICE NO. 12-25, SUITABILITY:
ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE ON FINRA’S NEW SUITABILITY RULE, at 4 (2012).
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“high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable
principles of trade.” 139
The internal approach is already part of compliance, which is why
it would be a reorientation or a reemphasis in this field. When
talking about effective compliance, compliance officers often refer to
a “culture of compliance” in their broker-dealer firm or to the fact
that the firm has a certain “tone at the top.” 140 These words must
refer to a way of thinking about or a perspective on compliance that
reflects internalized attitudes in firm employees. In other words, in a
firm with a “good” culture, compliance officers say that they can
generally trust the brokers and supervisors to make legal and ethical
decisions and thus conduct themselves in line with the firm’s goals of
customer service and benefit, which, in turn, reflect the law and
professional standards. In such a firm, a compliance officer can rely
upon the brokers themselves to be compliant and to enforce
compliance among one another. 141 Compliance officers are called in
only if there are new issues or problems, the compliance issue is not
obvious and brokers need to discuss it with a compliance specialist,
or a broker just wants confirmation about his or her approach.
To create this internal compliance, a compliance officer needs to
ensure that the goals and policies of securities laws and professional
standards are always in the foreground of brokers’ minds when they
are making business and client decisions—in other words, to ensure
139. See FINRA Rule 2010, supra note 104. The examples of a broker’s ability to
exercise discretion in everyday tasks, despite detailed FINRA rules, are numerous (e.g., how
and where to execute orders, conducting sales seminars). Of course, there are examples where
rules leave the broker little room for discretion. See, e.g., NASD Rule 3040, [2009–2014
Transfer Binder] FINRA Manual (Wolters Kluwer) 17353 (2014) (a broker cannot engage in a
private securities transaction without first having provided written notice to his or her firm).
140. See supra note 103 and accompanying text; see also SIFMA, The Evolving Role of
Compliance, supra note 49, at 5 (“At the same time, Compliance’s strongest contribution may
be to help the business shape appropriate standards and adopt practices that promote the right
behaviors from the very start.”); TAMAR FRANKEL, LEGAL DUTIES OF FIDUCIARIES 312
(2012) (discussing the importance of leaders in the culture of legal compliance).
141. See generally Jennifer J. Kish-Gephart et al., Bad Apples, Bad Cases, and Bad Barrels:
Meta-Analytic Evidence About Sources of Unethical Decisions at Work, 95 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
1, 6–7, 21 (2010) (finding that the characteristics of the organization, such as its ethical
culture and climate, have a considerable influence on unethical decisions in the firm; with
“ethical climate” meaning the broad “organizational procedures, policies, and practices with
moral” dimensions and values, and “ethical culture” meaning a narrower concept of an
organization’s systems, procedures, and practices for guiding and supporting ethical conduct).
Interestingly, the literature cited by the authors suggests that the existence of a code of
conduct, the paradigm of the external compliance system, has little deterrent effect on
unethical conduct. See id. at 13.
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that the goals and policies do not “fade” in a given decision. 142 This
purpose changes the nature of the compliance officer’s role from
being only a monitor of employee performance of WSPs to being an
advocate and educator for the policies and standards behind them.
The compliance officer would help identify the goals, policies, and
standards for decision making with respect to a particular brokerdealer activity, whether it be trading, advising, managing accounts,
or selling products. 143 A compliance officer is well suited for this role
because he or she is close to decisions that happen at every level of
the firm and has historically been an advisor to brokers. Moreover,
compliance’s connection to the granular nature of decision making
in financial firms ensures that a compliance officer is also available to
respond appropriately to broker inquiries about the application of
policies and standards on specific issues. Furthermore, in everyday
decision making, compliance officers can present to other employees
a model of thinking and conduct—to act as a kind of moral compass,
which itself has been shown to be important in reducing illegal and
unethical conduct and organizational conflict in firms. 144
142. The view of human decision making offered and accepted here is that conscious,
deliberative reflection (System 2) can override automatic (System 1) and other motivations, so
long as a space and time are given to the former. See supra note 8 (on ethical fading); see also
Kish-Gephart et al., supra note 141, at 20 (finding that unethical conduct is reduced when
certain characteristics of the moral issue involved are highlighted, in particular the magnitude of
the consequences of the conduct, their probability, the proximity of the victim, and the
foregrounding of social norms); Mark N. Bing et al., An Experimental Investigation of an
Interactive Model of Academic Cheating Among Business School Students, 11 ACAD. MGMT.
LEARNING & EDUC. 28, 39 (2012) (showing that cheating by students declines when they are
reminded of their school’s ethics codes and specifically instructed on how prohibited conduct is
detected and punished); Guido Palazzo et al., Ethical Blindness, 109 J. BUS. ETHICS 323 (2012)
(discussing how “ethical blindness” is created—where “ethical blindness” means that a person
adopts a rigid perspective, often as a result of complex causes, including organizational and
institutional structures, that closes out other frameworks, such as ethics). Of course, as will be
discussed below, illegal and unethical conduct can occur as a result of deliberative reasoning.
143. A compliance officer can elucidate the legal and ethical aspects of an employee’s
decision making by raising the legal and ethical issues in his or her conversation with the
employee. See Brian C. Gunia et al., Contemplation and Conversation: Subtle Influences on
Moral Decision Making, 55 ACAD. MGMT. J. 13, 17, 22 (2012) (finding that this kind of
conversation, as opposed to conversation focusing on self-interest, leads to more ethical
decisions). On the other hand, acting on self-interested impulses and conversing on a selfinterested basis can “prime” future decisions to follow the self-interest motivation. See id. at
27. In other words, conversation here is used to counteract decision making that is “primed”
by automatic motivations.
144. In a related vein, social psychologists have demonstrated that leaders who have
internalized moral values and who give public expression to them help produce organizations
that have less unethical conduct and less inter-organization conflict (i.e., among members).
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The internal approach faces daunting challenges in
implementation. This approach sets for itself the task of creating a
complex personal and social identity for brokers, which would value
deliberation on legal policies and professional standards and which
must push aside, or at least check, other individual and group
identities at odds with it, such as an individual’s and a division’s
single-minded pursuit of profit. 145 To accomplish this task,
compliance must use the guidance of psychologists, social
psychologists, organizational theorists, and even neuroscientists
about how best to encourage the creation of this identity and
individual attributes that will together lead to internal compliance.
Scholars in these disciplines offer guidance on how to create legally
compliant and ethical individuals and organizations. 146 The learning
of these scholars must be used to help train compliance officers,
who, without pretending to be psychologists, must understand the
goal that they are trying to achieve and the empirically established
methods and techniques needed to achieve that goal. 147 Shifting the
They hypothesize that this may be due to the fact that organization members model their
conduct on the leader, who generally typifies the “ideal” of the group. See David M. Mayer et
al., Who Displays Ethical Leadership, and Why Does It Matter? An Examination of Antecedents
and Consequences of Ethical Leadership, 55 ACAD. MGMT. J. 151, 153–54 (2012). This is a
social identity approach, where a group or organization’s identity, which its members accept, is
greatly formed by its leader. However, it is by no means certain that ethical leaders alone will
create a culture of values or a beneficial social identity in broker-dealers. See Joel Gehman et al.,
Values Work: A Process Study of the Emergence and Performance of Organizational Values
Practices, 56 ACAD. MGMT. J. 84, 108 (2013) (rejecting the view that organizational values
come from the “top-down” and are relatively stable, but arguing instead that, constantly
subject to change and refinement, it is locally and “through discussions, negotiations, and
ongoing network reconfigurations that values practices are performed”).
145. See supra note 136.
146. See, e.g., BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 8, at 152–65 (discussing ways to
improve ethical decision making in oneself and in organizations). Awrey, Blair, and Kershaw
use the work of organizational theorists to discuss how conduct in financial firms can be made
more ethical and “other regarding,” essentially by having processes devoted to raising ethical
concerns in this conduct. They discuss some of these processes in the context of U.K. financial
regulation. See Dan Awrey et al., Between Law and Markets: Is There a Role for Culture and
Ethics in Financial Regulation?, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 191 (2013).
147. To take one example, compliance officers could learn techniques for screening
brokers to detect those who might have a propensity for ethical or unethical conduct. As
Giacalone and Promislo observe in the academic context, it is useful to be aware of how
individuals possess a mindset prone to or primed for ethical failings so that educators can
address it. See Giacalone & Promislo, supra note 20, at 94–95. For a recent example of this
propensity, see Christopher M. Matthews, Ex-SAC Portfolio Manager Martoma Was Expelled
from Harvard Law School, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 9, 2014 7:16 PM), http://online.wsj.com/
news/articles/SB10001424052702304347904579310882291980594 (manager who was
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emphasis from external to internal compliance will not happen
overnight, and compliance officers have to recognize and maintain
the psychological effectiveness of an external control system as a
check on illegal and unethical conduct. Indeed, the complexity of
human thinking and behavior demands this external check so that
brokers do not override their ethical self. 148 In sum, the challenge of
criminally prosecuted for insider trading had earlier doctored his law school transcript).
Compliance officers would also need to learn techniques for triggering ethical thinking in
decision making. Some of these techniques are as easy as raising ethical or legal issues before a
decision is made. See, e.g., BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 8, at 156–57. Even
automatic, rather than deliberative, processes could be used by compliance officers to create
ethical conduct. Significant research is now being done on how to “prime” or trigger ethical
conduct, particularly in high-performance, cognitively intensive settings. See generally David T.
Welsh & Lisa D. Ordóñez, Conscience Without Cognition: The Effects of Subconscious Priming
on Ethical Behavior, 57 ACAD. MGM,T. J. 723 (2014). Among other things, Welsh and
Ordóñez observe that people act ethically in order to maintain their self-concept as an ethical
person and that the key to motivating ethical conduct is to cause them to see a decision or
conduct as raising the ethical decision framework. They find that, in high-cognitive activities
with demanding performance goals, subconscious priming, which operates almost
automatically (e.g., through the use of symbols, images, stories, etc. in the workplace) and
does not use much of an individual’s cognitive resources, may be best in triggering ethical
decision making, particularly where constant monitoring is unavailable.
148. The reference here is to, among other things, emerging research that the conduct of
individuals in financial firms may be influenced by hormones, such as testosterone, which
promotes risk-taking, or cortisone, which decreases it. It is thus possible that neurobiological
influences could override ethical decision making, which would require an external system to
guard against such conduct. See John M. Coates et al., From Molecule to Market: Steroid
Hormones and Financial Risk-Taking, 365 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B 331, 337–39
(2010) (discussing the influence of such hormones and ways to guard against their negative
effects); see also JOHN COATES, THE HOUR BETWEEN DOG AND WOLF: RISK TAKING, GUT
FEELINGS, AND THE BIOLOGY OF BOOM AND BUST (2012) (discussing biological basis for risktaking in securities trading). Moreover, simply triggering the deliberative self to focus on legal
policies and ethical standards may not be enough to produce ethical decisions since, in certain
circumstances, individuals can use deliberative cognitive processes to override ethical values
(i.e., to convince themselves that they do not matter), a process known as “moral
disengagement.” See Dean A. Shepherd et al., “I Care About Nature, but . . .”: Disengaging
Values in Assessing Opportunities That Cause Harm, 56 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1251 (2013) (finding,
in a study of entrepreneurs, that those with high views of their own abilities, operating in a
highly competitive environment, override their own environmental values; suggesting that in
such environments, strong legal frameworks may be necessary to prevent violations). On how
moral disengagement occurs, see generally Albert Bandura et al., Mechanisms of Moral
Disengagement in the Exercise of Moral Agency, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 364
(1996). For a discussion of the classic processes of moral disengagement: justifying detrimental
action (i) by classifying it as moral, (ii) by diffusing the responsibility for it, (iii) by disregarding
or distorting its consequences, and (iv) by blaming the victims for one’s actions. Indeed,
Bandura explains that, under social cognitive theory, improper conduct is regulated by social
(i.e., external) sanctions as well as by “internalized self-sanctions.” See id. at 372. Thus,
external sanctions can be useful in light of the risk of disengagement of the self-sanctions. See
Weaver & Treviño, supra note 5, at 327–30 (finding that a compliance-based approach—what
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compliance is to achieve a reorientation towards an internal system
while maintaining an external system that does not squeeze out
other approaches.
This reorientation would require a significant change in the
perspective of regulators like the SEC or SROs like FINRA. In
particular, FINRA would have to alter its approach of responding to
every new problem or development in the brokerage industry by
requiring a broker-dealer to add new WSPs. It would be difficult as a
policy and organizational matter for FINRA to change its rules-based
orientation because this approach has characterized FINRA’s dealings
with broker-dealers for a long time. To take one example, FINRA’s
examiners demand, as evidence of a broker-dealer’s supervision of a
given business activity, written proof of a firm’s WSPs, the firm’s
records of compliance with the WSPs, and a chart of the hierarchy of
supervisors. 149 By contrast, if an examiner were to evaluate whether a
firm had an adequate internal compliance and customer-centric
culture in place, he or she would have to spend considerable time in
the firm to see how supervision and compliance operated in
practice. 150 In addition, management of FINRA’s member firms also
benefits from FINRA’s espousal of the external approach and may
resist any change to it. After all, broker-dealer executives can delegate
the responsibility for compliance to the compliance officers, whose
success or failure can be measured by the number of WSPs and their
enforcement, as well as the absence of significant enforcement actions
against the firm and its employees. Even if a problem occurs in a firm,
the firm and an executive can often rely upon the existence of a
compliance system as a defense to supervisory liability, as discussed
above. By contrast, internal compliance in a firm will require
significant commitment from and involvement by top management,
as the psychological literature suggests.

I have termed an external approach—deters unethical and illegal conduct, but produces less of
a commitment to an organization’s values than does a values-based approach, which leads the
authors to believe that a compliance-based approach is effective only when coupled with a
meaningful values-based approach).
149. On SEC and FINRA examinations, see generally Matthew C. Dwyer, Preparing for
Broker-Dealer Examinations, 5 PRAC. COMPLIANCE & RISK MGMT. FOR SEC. INDUSTRY 21
(May–June
2012),
available
at
http://www.mcdconsulting.com/attachments/File/Dwyer_PCRM_05-12.pdf.
150. Now an examiner might simply demand to see a firm’s Code of Ethics and any
statements by senior executives about the importance of ethics.
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A challenge to the reemphasis on internal compliance is,
therefore, convincing FINRA and its member firms to go along
with, and to assist in, this reform. This Article argues to FINRA, as
well as to its member firms, that the reform will promote the
professional standards and culture that FINRA and its members have
always espoused and that are central to the concept of selfregulation. 151 The reform will also make compliance more effective
and will not result in abandoning the external supervisory system,
but will supplement it. 152 Another argument will likely appeal also to
FINRA’s membership, and possibly to FINRA itself: that the turn to
internal compliance will eventually reduce the regulatory burden on
broker-dealers as there will be less need for new FINRA rules, WSPs,
and the accompanying FINRA oversight. 153
Moreover, FINRA is unlikely to reorient the current compliance
approach on its own, especially since it is subject to SEC oversight as
an SRO. 154 Thus, the change would require convincing the SEC to
allow FINRA to promote the internal approach as well as to do the
same itself. The SEC should be receptive to the compliance
reorientation since it adopts a policy-based approach in much of its
own regulation of broker-dealers, which echoes the statutory
framework of the Exchange Act that offers general mandates, rather
than detailed rules, in this area. 155 It is true that the duty of
supervision, as well as the defense to a failure to supervise, which is
the foundation upon which external supervision and compliance
have been built, is driven by avoidance of SEC prosecution and thus
reinforces external compliance. 156 However, the defense is arguably
151. See FINRA Rule 2010, supra note 104 (referring to “standards of commercial honor
and . . . principles of trade”).
152. This “gradualist” approach, or an approach that simply shifts the emphasis in
compliance, may be more psychologically acceptable to FINRA executives as it is to
most people.
153. Professors Birdthistle and Henderson have argued that FINRA has evolved from an
SRO into a quasi-governmental agency and thus has an institutional interest in maintaining the
current emphasis upon rules and external compliance, which reinforces one reason for its
existence. See William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, Becoming a Fifth Branch, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 41–44 (2013) (discussing the “public choice” explanation for why
FINRA likes the current situation).
154. See supra notes 1–2.
155. Again, an obvious example is the requirement of the supervisory system, which, as
discussed above, is a general defense in the Exchange Act, but an extremely detailed brokerdealer mandate in FINRA rules. See supra text accompanying notes 23–46.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 26–36.
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broad enough to include both the internal approach to compliance
and a detailed supervisory system with WSPs. The SEC could
interpret an effective supervisory system as one that must have
internal compliance as one component.
The challenge will be convincing the SEC to allow FINRA to
promote the reemphasis on internal compliance. It is one thing for
the SEC to publicize the culture of compliance, as it does today,
when it can rely upon FINRA to impose a heavily rule-based external
compliance approach on firms; it is another thing for the SEC to
take the same approach without the protection of FINRA’s detailed
rule-making and rule-monitoring. The SEC would be concerned
about the perception that it is too soft on the securities industry by
approving a FINRA reorientation toward internal compliance and by
allowing FINRA to emphasize rules and external compliance. The
SEC would fear the occurrence of a situation like those in the past 157
where investors were harmed by conduct not explicitly forbidden or
addressed by specific rules. Critics would accuse the SEC of having
forgotten these past failings of self-regulation and of being too
accommodating to broker-dealers and to the securities industry. 158
Therefore, it is unrealistic to expect that, just by appealing to its
commitment to a culture of compliance, the SEC will be convinced
to approve the dilution of FINRA’s current emphasis upon the
external compliance approach, especially since the SEC occupies a
difficult political position—it is short on resources, but then blamed
for scandals in the securities markets. 159 Moreover, the SEC could
contend that it has now struck the right balance between internal
and external compliance by promoting the culture of compliance
itself while leaving to FINRA the imposition of detailed rules that
engender the external-compliance system. However, the SEC must
understand that the balance is illusory, that the domination of the
external approach squeezes out the internal and, therefore, that the
SEC needs to alter the orientation if compliance is to succeed in its
mission. The important question then becomes what will convince

157. See supra note 43 (discussing the case that led to FINRA’s imposition of a rule
requiring the testing of supervisory systems, with particular attention to specific issues like the
safeguarding of customer assets).
158. See generally POSER & FANTO, supra note 50, § 1.01 n.3 (listing these failures).
159. See STRATEGIC PLAN: FISCAL YEARS 2010–2015, supra note 128 (discussing the
SEC’s budgetary constraints). On being blamed for scandals, see supra note 123 (discussing
the blame placed on the SEC for Madoff’s Ponzi scheme).
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the SEC to take the initial steps, apart from persuading it of the
theoretical merits of the internal approach in producing compliant
conduct. 160 It would be worthwhile, then, if the SEC, as well as
FINRA, could be provided with ways of measuring the effectiveness
of the internal approach, which would provide them with tangible
signs of its benefits.
B. The Conditions to the Reorientation
1. Measurements of the value of the internal approach
One would expect that, over time, the overall incidents of illegal
and unethical conduct would decrease in the brokerage industry if
internal compliance took hold—otherwise, this approach would have
little or no value. This decrease could be measured by the number of
SEC and FINRA disciplinary actions aimed at individuals as well as
meritorious customer complaints and arbitration actions. 161
Accordingly, one could persuade the SEC and FINRA to promote
the internal approach by arguing that its effect could be empirically
measured over time. The problem here, however, would be proof of
causation because, as mentioned above, the internal approach is not
meant to replace the external approach but rather to supplement it.
Thus, any decrease in legal, rule, and standard violations could be
due to the enhanced effectiveness of the external system as well as
160. If the SEC were to emphasize the internal approach, that emphasis might provide
the brokerage industry with an important example of the SEC’s appreciation of the
predicament of broker-dealer firms that must deal with a seemingly unending number of costly
new regulations and rules as well as the resultant need for new WSPs. This cost issue has been
particularly highlighted by court cases striking down SEC rules because the SEC has done an
inadequate economic analysis of the associated costs. See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647
F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (striking down an SEC rule requiring public companies to allow
certain large shareholders to nominate directors on the company’s annual proxy statement).
But the only way in which the promotion of internal compliance would be meaningful, as
opposed to the SEC’s current lip service to the culture of compliance, would be if, as the
internal approach takes hold in firms, the SEC and FINRA would not increase, and might
actually decrease, the number of rules affecting broker-dealers.
161. FINRA provides basic annual data on investor complaints and disciplinary actions
that FINRA enforcement has brought. See FINRA Statistics & Data, FIN. INDUSTRY REG.
AUTHORITY, http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/Statistics/ (last updated Aug. 19, 2014); see
INDUSTRY
REG.
AUTHORITY,
also
Dispute
Resolution
Statistics,
FIN.
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/FINRADisputeResolution/AdditionalResou
rces/Statistics/ (last updated Sept. 16, 2014). The SEC provides annual data on enforcement
actions in an annual report. See, e.g., Select SEC and Market Data: Fiscal 2012, SEC.GOV,
http://www.sec.gov/about/secstats2012.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2014).
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renewed FINRA and SEC enforcement or threat of enforcement or
it could be the result of applying the internal approach or some
combination of the two. In any event, causation for the decline in
disciplinary actions is likely to be muddied and difficult to establish,
and the decline might take considerable time to appear. Thus, these
statistics would not be useful, without further exploration, in
justifying to the SEC and FINRA that they can measure the
effectiveness of the reorientation to the internal approach.
Since the ultimate goal of internal compliance is to change the
culture of a broker-dealer so as to prevent misconduct and to
promote customer-oriented behavior, the better measure of its
effectiveness would be the decline in instances of widespread
misconduct and questionable practices in firms. In other words, if
the internal approach takes hold in firms, one would expect to see
fewer instances of institutional misconduct. These are not situations
where the rules or professional standards are inadequate, but where
the rules and standards are ignored or gamed throughout an
organization or a significant part of it. 162 These situations are also
most damaging to the securities industry because they generally
reveal abuses of numerous customers as employees and even
supervisors put their own self-interest over customer interests. As
noted earlier, the external approach is not effective in addressing this
phenomenon because monitoring cannot be omnipresent and
because external monitoring by compliance officers is generally
gamed or simply ignored where there is a weak culture, widespread
acceptance of illegal and questionable conduct, and/or the
participation or willful blindness of supervisors.
Perhaps the SEC and FINRA could be persuaded to promote the
internal approach through a pilot program. One could argue to
them that there will be a way to measure the program’s effectiveness
by tabulating the instances of institutionalized misconduct in the
securities industry. Again, these would be cases where an entire firm,
or a significant part of it, such as a branch or a division, is engaged in
the misconduct. That is, the prohibited behavior would not involve
legal, rule, or professional-standard violations by a few individuals or
in a small broker-dealer, even if the violations were serious in nature.
It would also include instances where the misconduct appeared in a

162. Institutionalized misconduct clearly appeared in many of the firms involved in the
packaging and selling of mortgage-backed securities. See supra text accompanying notes 105–115.
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number of firms or was even industry-wide. These cases are generally
typified by a charge of failure to supervise leveled against the firm
and its top executives for numerous violations and even widespread
corruption throughout an entire firm or in a significant part of it. 163
The cases would also be brought to light as a result of numerous
customer complaints directed at many firm employees as opposed to
at just one “rogue” broker.
As mentioned above, the SEC and FINRA now provide general
statistics on their enforcement actions, as well as their results. FINRA
also similarly tabulates customer complaints in arbitration. More
significantly, FINRA’s disciplinary actions are available online, and
the SEC publishes its individual enforcement proceedings on its
website. 164 From this information, it is possible to arrive at an annual
assessment of institutionalized misconduct in the brokerage industry.
It should then be possible to compare this assessment from year to
year, as controlled for other factors such as the number of brokerdealers and branches. 165 The proposal would recommend that the
SEC and FINRA evaluate the success of the internal approach over
at least ten years in its pilot program. The data in the initial years of

163. A recent example, although an investment adviser and not a broker-dealer, is the
SEC’s charge of failure to supervise against Steven A. Cohen, the owner of S.A.C. Capital,
because of the allegation of widespread insider trading in his firm. See Steven A. Cohen,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3634 (July 19, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov.
FINRA is clearly interested in cases of organizational corruption. See, e.g., 2014 Exam
Priorities Overview Letter of Daniel M. Sibears, Executive Vice President, Member Regulation
Programs 3 (Jan. 2, 2014), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry
/@ip/@reg/@guide/ documents/industry/p419710.pdf (discussing FINRA’s plan to track
brokers who formerly worked at severely disciplined firms because they may be bringing illegal
and unethical practices to their new firms).
164. FINRA’s disciplinary actions are available at FINRA Disciplinary Actions Online
Database, FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY, http://www.finra.org/Industry/Enforcement/
DisciplinaryActions/ FDAS/. In addition, FINRA publishes monthly descriptions of
disciplinary resolutions for that month, which in turn hyperlink to the actual decision on its
website database. The SEC’s litigation part of its website, Litigation, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/litigation.shtml, has links to SEC decisions, litigation
releases, and results of administrative proceedings, among other things, which together provide
access to individual decisions. FINRA also provides access to arbitration awards. But these
would be less helpful since arbitrators typically do not write opinions or provide a justification
for their decisions. See FINRA Arbitration Awards Online Database, FIN. INDUSTRY REG.
AUTHORITY, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationandMediation/FormsTools/p018127.
165. That is, the number of broker-dealer firms has been steadily declining, while the
number of brokers or other representatives has stabilized and even recently increased. See
INDUSTRY
REG.
AUTHORITY,
FINRA
Statistics
&
Data,
FIN.
http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/Statistics/.
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the program will not reflect the success (or lack thereof) of the
internal approach; institutional misconduct does not happen
overnight and the internal approach needs several years to take hold
in firms as a result of FINRA’s and the SEC’s efforts (to be discussed
below). Thus, the data in years 6–10 will be more indicative of the
success of the approach than that in years 1–5.
The SEC and FINRA should also commission a survey of
brokerage employees to elicit “soft” information about the effect of
the adoption of the internal compliance approach. 166 They should do
a survey before undertaking to promote the internal approach as a
way of establishing a benchmark for the current situation of
compliance in the brokerage industry. They could then conduct the
same survey at regular intervals, for example every five years, to
measure the progress of the adoption of the internal approach in
firms. Firms would need to be careful to break down this data in
accordance with firm size because smaller firms will likely find the
adoption of the internal approach more challenging. Smaller firms
are in a more precarious economic position and the temptation to
push aside legal and professional standards for profits will be greater
in them. Similar surveys should also be done with brokerage clients,
both retail and institutional. 167 If the internal approach is succeeding,
one would expect that employees would reflect that compliance is an
important part of their firm’s culture and that customers would echo
that firms and brokers are increasingly customer-centered.
These ways of measuring the value of the internal compliance
approach may persuade the SEC and FINRA to promote internal
compliance, at least in a pilot program and then ultimately to adopt
internal compliance as a part of broker-dealer compliance. However,
there is little possibility that the data will show a decline in
institutional misconduct unless they actively support its
implementation in broker-dealers as opposed to today’s situation of
giving lip service to the culture of compliance while steadily
166. See Niki A. Den Nieuwenboer & Muel Kaptein, Spiraling Down into Corruption: A
Dynamic Analysis of the Social Identity Processes That Cause Corruption in Organizations to
Grow, 83 J. BUS. ETHICS 133 (2008) (discussing research methods for identifying
organizational corruption, including surveying employees about the organizational norms and
scope for misconduct in their firms).
167. The SEC has commissioned similar studies in the past. See, e.g., ANGELA A. HUNG
ET AL., INVESTOR AND INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKERDEALERS, RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE (2008) (investigating, among other things,
how well investors understood the duties of their financial advisors).
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reinforcing the external approach. It is time then to turn to a
discussion of how they can specifically promote internal compliance.
2. Initial steps by the SEC and FINRA to promote internal compliance
The question arises whether the SEC should adopt the
reorientation toward internal compliance through an official notice
and comment procedure. 168 Since, as noted above, the reorientation
is only a reordering of existing compliance approaches, the SEC is
arguably not doing anything fundamentally new here, which is what
happens when it decides to give special examination or enforcement
attention to a particular problem or area of financial activity. It is
thus within the SEC’s authority to engage in this reorientation as a
policy matter, which would not demand any notice and comment. 169
However, it may be advisable for the SEC to accomplish this
reorientation through a notice and comment procedure in order to
effectively implement the reorientation itself and to deal with any
opposition to it. This procedure would have the SEC highlight
internal compliance in a policy statement, 170 explain its orientation,
and suggest the ways in which it could be accomplished in a firm.
This procedure also has the advantage of allowing broker-dealers and
other interested parties to raise problems or issues with it and its
implementation that might not otherwise be known. Moreover,
since internal compliance could involve new costs to broker-dealers
as compliance officers spend more time on advising employees or
designing ways of triggering lawful and professional conduct, the
SEC might discuss the costs in terms of the benefits of having more
compliant firms, as measured in the ways discussed above. 171

168. This procedure is required by a federal agency when it issues a “substantive,” as
opposed to an interpretive, rule or policy. See 5 U.S.C. § 553.
169. The SEC could contend that it is interpreting the statutory defense to supervisory
liability, see text accompanying notes 29–30, by requiring the promotion of internal
compliance as part of the defense. It is not clear that the SEC need even go so far since it is
really taking a policy position on effective compliance.
170. Here the SEC would be clarifying its position on compliance. In the alternative, it
could issue a “concept release” as a prelude to doing actual rulemaking on internal compliance.
171. If the SEC’s support for internal compliance is considered substantive, it would be
under a legal obligation, among other things, to evaluate its effect upon smaller broker-dealers.
See 5 U.S.C. § 603. On the other hand, insofar as the SEC is making a policy pronouncement
encouraging, but not mandating, broker-dealers to adopt internal compliance, it would avoid
the difficult cost/benefit analysis and controversy that comes with it today.
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Another possible, and perhaps even preferable, approach would
be to have FINRA, rather than the SEC, propose the compliance
reorientation through a new rule or an amendment to an existing
rule. 172 This approach makes sense because the emphasis on internal
compliance is an ideal subject for FINRA action, given that it
concerns the internal governance and supervision of broker-dealers.
Although there are several possibilities for the rule, the best
approach is to have FINRA propose an additional supplementary
material to FINRA Rule 3130, which, as noted earlier, has the CCO
requirement for firms and the CEO’s certification as to compliance
after consultation with the CCO. 173 This Rule now includes
supplementary material that, among other things, describes the
importance of compliance processes, the role of the CCO, and the
responsibility for compliance. 174 The proposed supplementary
material about internal compliance could read as follows:
.11 Internal Compliance. An important task of the CCO and the
other compliance officers is to promote “internal compliance” in a
member. Internal compliance means that associated persons use the
goals and policies of federal securities regulation and FINRA
professional standards, as well as ethics, in their decision making
and thus in orienting their conduct in addition to their compliance
with federal laws and regulations and FINRA rules. For this
purpose, compliance officers would be expected to assist associated
persons to make decisions and otherwise to conduct themselves in
accordance with these goals, policies, standards, and ethics. This
assistance would include providing advice on compliance to
associated persons, conducting appropriate training on legal,
professional, and ethical obligations and otherwise creating an
environment in a firm conducive to appropriate decision making
and conduct. The goal of internal compliance is to have associated
persons who would be legally, professionally, and ethically
compliant.

Having FINRA issue the addition to Rule 3130’s supplementary
material allows, at a minimum, for a two-stage comment process.
First, broker-dealers and other interested parties could offer
comments to FINRA’s proposed addition, which would be issued in
172. Alternatively, FINRA, rather than the SEC, could issue a policy statement
promoting internal compliance.
173. See supra notes 46–47.
174. See FINRA Rule 3130.03, .05, .06.
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a regulatory notice. 175 Second, before approving FINRA’s rule
change, the SEC would put the supplementary material out for
further comment. 176 In the SEC’s request for comment, as well as in
its eventual approval of the rule change, the SEC can underline the
importance of internal compliance in broker-dealers and put its
weight clearly behind the approach.
In addition to proposing the new supplementary material,
FINRA and SEC officials must take other actions to promote the
reorientation from external to internal compliance. FINRA would do
what it typically does whenever it is setting forth a new rule or
policy: its senior officers would publicize internal compliance in their
speeches in various industry fora and on FINRA’s website while
FINRA examiners would make it an examination priority. 177
Moreover, as a result of examinations, FINRA might well issue a
report about the practices in different firms with respect to their
creating internal compliance as a way of highlighting particularly
successful models used by firms. 178 Furthermore, behind every
FINRA rule, and thus its requirement for specific WSPs, are the
goals, policies, and standards that the rule is intended to promote.
Indeed, FINRA officials often refer to the policies in their speeches,
and FINRA regulatory notices similarly highlight the policies. 179
Therefore, whenever it issues a notice, FINRA should ensure that

175. Occasionally, FINRA will issue several regulatory notices as to a particular proposal
if the initial one receives significant comments and if, as a result, FINRA must reissue it to take
into account changes suggested by commentators.
176. The notice and comment period of a proposed FINRA rule is governed by 15
U.S.C. § 78s(b) and by 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-4. The understanding here is that the proposed
new supplementary material would not be a “stated policy, practice, or interpretation with
respect to the meaning, administration, or enforcement of an existing rule.” See 15 U.S.C. §
78s(b)(3)(A) (governing rules that take effect immediately upon filing).
177. For example, each year FINRA sets forth its examination priorities for the upcoming
examinations. See, e.g., 2014 Exam Priorities Overview Letter of Daniel M. Sibears, Executive
Vice President, Member Regulation Programs (Jan. 2, 2014), available at
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@guide/documents/industry/p4197
10.pdf.
178. For example, FINRA and the SEC issued a joint guidance on effective practices for
broker-dealers’ internal inspections of branches. See, e.g., FINRA, REG. NOTICE NO. 11-54,
Branch Office inspections (Nov. 2011) (attaching a copy of the joint FINRA-SEC risk alert on
the topic).
179. In its release on the new suitability rule, for example, FINRA referred to the policies
behind the rule. See FINRA, Know Your Customer and Suitability, supra note 42, at 1 (“The
know-your-customer and suitability obligations are critical to ensuring investor protection and
promoting fair dealing with customers and ethical sales practices.”).
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the policies do not recede into the background when the notice
turns to a description of the rules and the ways in which compliance
with and supervision of the rules are to be implemented by firms.
Rather, explaining and promoting the policies should become a
major point of the notice as well as in the publicity and follow-up
explanation surrounding it. The notice should thus direct
compliance officers to bring the policies and standards to the
foreground in particular business decisions targeted by the rules and
make suggestions as to how this might be accomplished. 180 SEC
officials could do the same, emphasizing the importance of internal
compliance in their speeches, in their approval of FINRA rules, and
in any general pronouncements on broker-dealer conduct. 181
FINRA and the SEC must also rethink the role of the
compliance officer as a part of the firm’s reporting system of
violations to FINRA and the SEC, as well as to the DOJ. As noted
above, a compliance officer monitors employees for compliance,
follows up on red flags, and reports legal, regulatory, and ethical
violations to supervisors. 182 The supervisors then take action to
address any violations and to prevent further ones, which may
include reporting to FINRA and possibly to the SEC and DOJ. 183
The reporting of violations shows the effectiveness of the supervisory
system and, as discussed above, is a defense for the supervisors and
the firm against a charge of supervisory liability for the violation. 184
In addition, FINRA and SEC enforcement officials, as well as federal
prosecutors, take a more accommodating position towards a firm
180. Again, to take the suitability example, in its initial rule release, FINRA spent
considerable time discussing the new rule, its technical differences from the old, and issues
relating to implementation, but little time on the policies. Certainly, compliance officials, firms,
and brokers need to understand how to implement the rule. See id. But if FINRA itself puts
little emphasis on the policies of investor protection and fair dealing as orienting the
application of the rule, it is likely that firms and compliance officers will take the same
approach in its implementation. And the rule soon becomes a set of steps to follow, rather than
an effort to serve the client.
181. As the SEC’s examination of broker-dealers is less extensive than FINRA’s and more
targeted to risky firms, the SEC also establishes examination priorities and internal compliance
could become one of them. See SEC OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS AND
EXAMINATIONS, EXAMINATION PRIORITIES FOR 2013 (Feb. 21, 2013).
182. See supra text accompanying notes 69–72.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 74–75.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 30–31. In addition, under the Exchange Act,
control liability would arise under Section 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a), but the controlling party
has a “good faith” defense which can be satisfied in the same way as the defense to supervisory
liability—having an effective supervisory system.
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with respect to its own liability when it reports violations and assists
in the investigations of them. 185 Indeed, if a broker-dealer is a public
firm, compliance officers may feel particular pressure to start the
reporting process since a relatively new law and regulation governing
whistleblowers do not require a whistleblower to report a potential
violation internally. Furthermore, a firm wants to avoid a situation
where an employee or someone else, rather than the firm itself,
reports such a violation to regulators or prosecutors. 186
Yet having a compliance officer as part of the reporting structure
for violations and ultimately a participant in enforcement conflicts
with his or her role as a promoter of internal compliance. This latter
role requires that a compliance officer be a close advisor to
employees and be trusted by them so that they are willing to raise
difficult matters with the officer. As other scholars have analyzed
well, that function is undermined by employees’ perception that a
compliance officer’s goal is to protect supervisors and the firm by
providing information about them to supervisors and ultimately to
regulators and prosecutors. 187 Fearing that any information shared
with compliance officers will be reported “up the chain,” employees
will be less open and more reluctant to consult with them. Indeed,
185. This generally means that the prosecutor or the enforcement official does not
prosecute the firm or defers prosecution of it because of the firm’s cooperation in investigating
the misconduct by its employees. See generally SEC DIV. OF ENFORCEMENT, ENFORCEMENT
MANUAL (Mar. 9, 2012) (setting forth policies relating to and grounds for entering into
cooperation, deferred, and non-prosecution agreements); DEPT. OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF
FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISES §§ 9–28 (giving credit arises from
cooperation, which means, among other things, disclosure of the relevant fact and taking of
remedial action); FINRA, REG. NOTICE NO. 08-70, FINRA INVESTIGATION: FINRA
PROVIDES GUIDANCE REGARDING CREDIT FOR EXTRAORDINARY COOPERATION (Nov. 2008)
(defining such cooperation as (1) self-reporting of violation, (2) extraordinary steps to fix
deficient procedures or systems, (3) extraordinary remediation to customers, or (4) providing
substantial assistance to FINRA investigations).
186. The whistleblowing provision is pursuant to Section 21F of the Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78u-6, added by Section 922 of Dodd-Frank. The SEC implemented this provision
in Rule 21F, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.21F-1 to 21F-17.
187. See generally John Hasnas, Managing the Risks of Legal Compliance: Conflicting
Demands of Law and Ethics, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 507, 517 (2008) (noting conflicts between
command and control and self-regulatory approach). See also SIFMA, supra note 49, at 30
(cautioning regulators against “deputizing” compliance officers as their agents); Vass, supra
note 49, at 10 (“To the greatest extent possible, regulators should avoid directly using the
work product of Compliance personnel in proceedings against firms or their officers or
employees. If firms’ officers or employees perceive this to be likely, they may react to
Compliance initiatives and inquiries with suspicion and reluctance to provide complete
cooperation and candid responses.”).
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social psychologists emphasize that the most effective diffusion of
models of ethical conduct and decision making comes from those
whom we perceive to be part of our social group. 188 In sum, the
reporting and potential enforcement roles of the compliance officer
thus reinforce his or her position as part of external compliance. 189
There is no question that the SEC and FINRA (as well as the
DOJ) will always expect broker-dealers, their employees, and, by
extension, compliance officers to report serious violations of the law.
Therefore, just as a firm must maintain its external compliance for
psychological deterrence, it must have compliance officers report
these violations to supervisors and to FINRA and the SEC where
necessary. But to promote the reorientation toward internal
compliance, the SEC and FINRA could emphasize that generally
discipline is the responsibility of supervisors in the firm rather than of
compliance officers. At a minimum, the SEC should clarify that, in
the absence of very special circumstances, compliance officers are not
supervisors, which would clearly disassociate the former from the
latter role and its disciplinary implications. 190 In addition, both the
SEC and FINRA should state that compliance does not typically
have an enforcement role with respect to potential violations of the
law, regulation, or professional standards (other than calling
supervisors’ attention to problems or “red flags”); that role lies with
188. See, e.g., Francesca Gino et al., Contagion and Differentiation in Unethical Behavior,
20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 393, 394 (2009) (finding that cheating is significantly influenced by a
person’s social identification with the cheater (i.e., if the cheater is part of one’s social group),
with the opposite happening if the cheater is perceived to be an outsider; thus emphasizing the
importance of the peer group in ethical conduct).
189. The issue of reporting to authorities raises an issue beyond the scope of this article—
the dangers of an increased role of enforcement in the regulation of financial and other firms,
as evidenced by the increased criminalization of business conduct. This has been ably dealt
with by other scholars. For an early and valuable work on this subject, which is timely today,
see ROBERTA KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION (1981). Concerns about deterring
prosecution thus “crowd out” other forms of regulation of conduct in a firm. See generally
Miriam Baer, Organizational Liability and the Tension Between Corporate and Criminal Law,
19 J. L. & POL’Y 1 (2010).
190. See supra note 36. The SEC’s Division of Trading and Markets recently issued a
Frequently Asked Questions About Liability of Compliance and Legal Personnel at Broker-Dealers
under Sections 15(b)(4) and 15(b)(6) of the Exchange Act, U.S. SEC. EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/faq-cco-supervision-093013.htm. The
SEC staff echoed its position that compliance and legal personnel are not per se supervisors,
but that this status “depends on whether, under the facts and circumstances of a particular
case, that person has the requisite degree of responsibility, ability or authority to affect the
conduct of the employee whose behavior is at issue.” Id. Importantly, the staff did suggest that
a compliance officer does not become a supervisor when exercising his or her advisory role.
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another firm control function, such as the legal department. 191
Admittedly if, as a result of his or her monitoring, a compliance
officer reports a potential violation to a supervisor, he or she is
starting the enforcement process. However, the goal here is to
eliminate the factors that tie the officer too closely to enforcement
while recognizing that the compliance officer has the typical
reporting obligation of any employee.
The SEC and FINRA must also demonstrate that firms are
rewarded for successfully implementing internal compliance. The
most concrete measure is to take into consideration a firm’s internal
compliance when they are considering whether to bring, or are
actually bringing, a supervisory liability charge against it. The SEC
and FINRA, as well as the DOJ, have policies in place to reward a
firm for its supervisory system when evaluating its supervisory
liability, and they assert that they pursue a supervisory liability charge
only when there are specific grounds for it. 192 It would be
particularly useful as a way of promoting internal compliance if, in
specific enforcement actions other than in cases of widespread
misconduct, the SEC and FINRA gave some credit to the firm, as
well as to firm supervisors, for the firm’s internal compliance. The
credit approach can be done without undermining external
compliance, the failure of which may be the basis for the supervisory
liability (e.g., the absence of a WSP, the failure to carry out specific
procedures of a WSP) and which will have to be corrected. The
credit would take the form of lessening the penalty for the
supervisory violation based on a failure of external compliance. In
awarding credit for internal compliance, if it is appropriate, the SEC
and FINRA can take the opportunity to highlight features of a
targeted firm’s internal compliance that justified the credit (or its
denial), which will further guide firms on its implementation. 193

191. Firms themselves must try to separate these roles clearly, which can be challenging
since some compliance personnel also function as legal officers. See SIFMA, The Evolving Role
of Compliance, supra note 49, at 8–9.
192. See supra note 185.
193. Indeed, as discussed earlier, it was through its administrative decisions that the SEC
indicated to firms what would constitute an adequate compliance system. See supra text
accompanying notes 33–36.
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IV. CONCLUSION

This Article argues for a reorientation in the role of the
compliance officer in broker-dealers as a way to promote internal
compliance among employees in these firms and, ultimately, to
create more investor confidence in broker-dealers and in the financial
system. Part I first discussed the history and evolution of compliance,
with reference to its statutory, regulatory, and FINRA basis, which
was designed to assist supervisors and the firm in their statutory duty
to enforce the federal securities laws, regulations, and industry
standards. It then reviewed the current state of compliance and the
typical tasks of compliance officers, who produce detailed WSPs,
monitor firm employees for compliance with them, and report any
violations within the supervisory structure of the firm.
Part II discussed the problems with this external approach. It
explained that this approach is an example of the techniques of
“soft” power and control that emerged from the Enlightenment and
that have been used in many domains both to control individuals
and to make them more productive. Yet this “panopticon”
perspective not only provokes resistance from the subject of the
discipline, but also presents an unattainable model of total oversight
and control of the targeted individuals. The Part then explained how
the external approach, while necessary as an outer bound to prevent
illegality and ethical abuses, is not psychologically effective if it is the
sole model of compliance, particularly in financial services like
brokerage, since financial professionals like brokers need to have
discretion to make decisions on behalf of customers and otherwise to
be productive. External compliance, albeit an integral part of the
securities business, risks being seen by business employees as external
to their business identity, which can lead them to feel justified in
ignoring or gaming the laws, rules, and standards that compliance
enforces—the very opposite result compliance systems intend to
produce. In addition, external compliance squeezes out other
approaches, despite the pronouncements by the SEC and FINRA in
favor of the culture of compliance. Moreover, as the Part showed,
this estrangement of compliance from the business of broker-dealers
can produce adverse consequences because the recent financial crisis
revealed problems in firms with detailed compliance systems. Despite
these problems with the external orientation, however, Congress, the
SEC, and FINRA are reinforcing and extending the model of
external compliance, which imposes heavy regulatory burdens upon
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broker-dealers that adversely affect their vibrancy, flexibility, and
competitiveness.
Part III argued for a reorientation toward internal compliance in
broker-dealers and suggested how the change can be achieved.
Instead of being only the producer and monitor of compliance with
WSPs, compliance officers must emphasize their role as a counselor
and promoter of a compliance culture, which means foregrounding
the policies behind the securities laws and regulations and
professional and even ethical standards. In doing this compliance,
officers would play a major role in changing the decision framework
for business employees so that these policies and ethics do not
“fade” in business decisions. The Part reviewed ways in which
compliance officers can promote this internal compliance and also
contended that this changed emphasis requires the assistance of
FINRA and the SEC. This Part recognized that FINRA and the SEC
would resist this change, which is contrary to their established
approach and which risks making them seem soft towards the
securities industry.
Part III concluded by arguing that this resistance might be
overcome by showing the SEC and FINRA ways to measure the
effectiveness of the internal approach, which could then be tried in a
multi-year pilot program. It recommended that, after a suitable
period of initiation, FINRA and the SEC evaluate whether instances
of institutionalized misconduct in firms, branches, or significant
divisions declined as a result of internal compliance. The Part also
recommended that FINRA and the SEC conduct surveys of
brokerage employees and customers as to whether the culture of
firms changed as a result of reorienting compliance towards an
internal approach. The Part then discussed the possibility that the
SEC could promote internal compliance through a policy statement
and particularly recommended that FINRA propose the
reorientation in new supplementary material to an existing
supervisory rule, which will provide the reorientation with express
regulatory authority as well as allow potential problems with the
approach to surface. The Part then discussed how FINRA and the
SEC could promote internal compliance, for example, by
emphasizing policies in their rule making. Finally, the Part made
several suggestions about how FINRA and the SEC could lessen the
enforcement role of compliance, which is an impediment to internal
compliance, in particular by clearly separating compliance from
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supervision and by giving firms credit for internal compliance in
enforcement decisions.
This Article recognizes the growing importance of compliance in
broker-dealers while arguing that a continuation of the current
external approach needs to be supplemented with an internal one.
Under the external approach, WSPs will be piled upon other WSPs
until they risk being followed in a routine way and occasionally
disregarded or gamed. Compliance, as currently configured, has the
unique advantage of being present throughout the financial firm, at
all layers and in every business. In a time of government deficits and
regulatory limitations, compliance is available to help achieve the
goals and policies of the laws, regulations, and professional standards
governing broker-dealers, which are ultimately social ones. But
compliance has to be reoriented to promote internal compliance if it
is to have this valuable effect.
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